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SHOULD WE ALL BE WELFARE
ECONOMISTS?
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.*

INTRODUCTION

·

On what normative foundation should the edifice of law and public
policy be built? What are proper grounds for claims of individual
right, and how, generally, do those grounds relate to considerations of
individual well-being and social welfare?
In this Essay, I argue that individual well-being and a related
concept of social welfare should be important considerations in the
design of legal rules, but not the exclusive ones. When the notion of
well-being receives substantive content, the most plausible and attrac
tive definitions all allow a distinction between what will best promote
a person's well-being and what that person might rationally judge to
be most choice-worthy,1 typically in light of a moral or aesthetic ideal.
This distinction is important. Once it is recognized that the greatest
possible well-being is not what everyone necessarily values most, the
notion that public policy should be based exclusively on social welfare
- defined as an increasing function of the well-being of individuals loses plausibility. It becomes important to explore the relationship be
tween well-being and other values and to ask what else people might
rationally value,2 sometimes more than their own well-being, and why.
In the answers to these questions lie the foundations of rights.

*
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.A. 1975, J.D. 1 980,Yale. - Ed. I am
grateful to a number of friends and colleagues who have commented on previous drafts, in
cluding Scott Brewer, Allen Ferrell, Christine Jolls, Greg Keating, Howell Jackson, Louis
Kaplow, Dan Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Fred Schauer, Steve Shavell, and Bill Stuntz, as
well as participants in a workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Mark
Freeman and Kevin Walsh provided valuable research assistance.

1. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., The Status of Well-Being, in 19 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 93, 98 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1998) (distinguishing well-being
from "choiceworthiness"); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of che Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 329 (1977) [hereinafter Sen,
Racional Fools] (discussing "commitment" to causes or ideals as a basis for choice that
"drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare").
2. Claims about what people "rationally value" could refe r either (strongly) to what ra
tionality commands that they value or (weakly) to what it would not be irrational for them to
value. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 200 (1986) (" 'Rational' may mean
either rationally required or rationally acceptable."). In references to what people rationally
value or in any comparable formulation that is preceded by a conditional verb such as
"might" or "could," or by "can," I intend to invoke the weaker understanding.
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Althougn this Essay ultimately confronts very large questions, I
begin w ith a narrower focus, furnished by my colleagues Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell in their important book Fairness Versus Welfare.3
In that book, Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal rules should be
based exclusively on calculations involving the "well-being" or
"utility" of "individuals. "4 (They use the terms "well-being" and
"util ity " interchangeably,5 as I shall do in the remainder of this Essay,
and refer recurrently to "individuals," apparently to emphasize that
social welfare is an increasing function of individual well-being.6)
Intending their book partly as a contribution to moral and political
philosophy,7 Kaplow and Shavell imply that there are no moral rights
not directly founded on considerations of individual well-being. In the
legal domain, constitutional law furnishes an especially instructive test
case for their theory's implications and attractiveness. If accepted,
Kaplow and. Shavell's argument would support recognition only of
rights that tend to be util ity-maximizing,8 or otherwise to promote
overall social welfare, at least insofar as past decisions do not
determine judic ial rulings.9 Their thesis rejects the foundational as
sumption of much constitutional doctrine and scholarship that people
have moral rights that are not all contingently grounded in utility func
t ions.10

3. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE {2002).
4. See id. at xvii ("Our thesis is that social decisions should be based exclusively on their
effects on the welfare of individuals - and, accordingly, should not depend on notions of
fairness, justice, or cognate concepts.").
5. See. e.g., id. at 18 (equating utility and well-being).
6. See, e.g., id. at 24 ("Under the rubric of welfare economics, the conception of social
welfare is based on individuals' well-being.").
·

7. See id. at xvii-xviii ("[O]ur subject is not limited to the law but rather concerns the
most general questions of social policymaking . . . . ").
8. Their position reflects a form of what is sometimes called "rule utilitarianism," which
"holds that we should not judge the rightness of [an] act by its consequences but by the
consequences of adopting the rule under which the particular act fa lls." JOHN HOSPERS, AN
INTRODUCl"ION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 608 {2d ed. 1 967). Rule utilitarianism thus
differs from act utilitarianism, which calls for case-by-case calculations of how utility could
best be promoted. Although act utilitarianism is not consistent with the recognition of
meaningful constitutional rights, rule utilitarianism could support a robust regime of rights
- though only of rights that would tend to promote utility, without regard to any other
value.
9. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that judges should generally employ welfare economic
analysis insofar as they have "policymaking discretion," but recognize that judges "are also
constrained by rules of procedure, statutes, precedent, and the Constitution." KAPLOW &
SHA YELL. supra note 3, at 397.
10. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of
Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 352-60 (1993) (arguing that rights reflect interests, some of
which are interests in well-being, but some of which are agency and dignitary interests not
reducible to well-being). I do not mean to imply that Kaplow and Shavell leave no place for
rights; they do contemplate rights predicated on calculations of social utility. Nor do I wish
to claim that moral and constitutional rights are never best explained by reference to inter-
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For several reasons·; Kaplow and Shaveil's challenge deserves close
consideration. The first involves their stature as scholars. Kaplow and
Shavell are prominent figures in the field of law and economics.11 In
preparing this book, they have forayed deeply into political theory and
moral philosophy,12 as well as a number of areas of substantive law. In
light of their stature, their views have a serious claim to attention. A
second reason lies in the barbed character of their arguments, many of
them aimed "to convince legal policy analysts". to alter their research
agendas.13 In essence, Kaplow and Shavell argue that all law professors
(and possibly all political theorists and moral philosophers) will be
wasting their time at best, and rendering pernicious advice at worst,14
until they embrace Kaplow and Shavell's preferred version of welfare
economics.15
The third reason that Kaplow and Shaven deserve attention in
volves their substantive arguments. Their main affirmative argument is
familiar: rational parties who did not know what role they would
occupy in society would choose to be governed by whatever rules
would produce the highest average utility,16 with some additional
ests in promoting well-being; some rights are best explained in this way. But I do mean to
claim, contrary to Kaplow and Shavell, that there are some rights that reflect values or
interests other than well-being and that have some power to resist appeals to a purported
overriding interest in promoting social welfare.
1 1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages,
39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Accuracy in the Determination
of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between
Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and
Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness
Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 1 10 YALE L.J. 237 (2000);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Should Legal
Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000).
12. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at xviii (noting that they address questions
that "have engaged philosophers from Aristotle to Hume and Kant, to Ross and Hare and
Rawls").
13. Id. at 472. Kaplow and Shavell repeatedly castigate "analysts" who advocate atten
tion to considerations of justice and fairness for failing to state their positions clearly and for
fa iling to meet other standards of argumen�tive rigor. See, e.g. , id. at 45 (asserting that "[i]t
is frequently difficult to ascertain what analysts mean when they discuss the fairness of legal
rules" because "(a)nalysts often use words like 'fairness' without defining them"): hi. at 470
(criticizing proponents of fa irness for failing to meet the "basic test" of stating their princi
ples with precision).
1 4. See id. at 383 (maintaining that analysis that relies on notions of fairness tends
"generally to be counterproductive").
15. See id. at 472 (arguing that all those who analyze legal policy issues should employ a
welfare economic framework).
16. For an earlier argument that rational parties would choose the rule structure yield
ing the highest average utility, see John Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational
Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 45-46 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams
eds., 1982).
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weight possibly attached to the well-being of the worst-off class.17 By
contrast, their main negative argument is fresh18 and, at first blush,
daunting. According to them, there are easily imaginable situations in
which any legal rule not based exclusively on considerations of indi
vidual well-being would make literally all affected parties worse-off
than they would be under a utility-maximizing rule.19 By design, rights
based theories will sometimes leave some people worse-off than they
would have been under a utility-maximizing regime; the point of such
theories is to protect individual rights against the claims of social wel
fare.20 But Kaplow and Shavell expect the recognition that rights might
diminish literally everybody's well-being to dissolve the appeal of
rights-based theories.21 Why, after all, would anyone favor a theory
that threatens to make everyone worse-off?22

17. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 440-43 {defending the welfare economic
approach as reflective of what rational persons, ex ante, would consent to).
Although Kaplow and Shavell insist that rational ex ante contractors would be con
cerned solely with promoting utility, they acknowledge that questions of fair distribution can
still arise. They note two possible approaches to distributive issues that would be consistent
with welfare economics, but decline to take a stand concerning which is preferable:
[U)nder the utilitarian approach, social welfare is taken to be the sum of individuals' utili
ties(, and how utility is distributed among individuals is considered normatively irrelevant].
Alternatively, the well-being of worse-off individuals might be given additional weight . . . .
In this book we do not defend any specific way of aggregating individuals' well-being . . . .
Rather. we argue, in essence, that legal policy analysis should be guided by reference to
some coherent way of aggregating individuals' well-being . . . .
Id. at 27.
18. It builds, however, on earlier writing by Amartya Sen noting that it is logically
impossible to be a "Pareto libertarian," or to hold simultaneously (i) that one situation is
always preferable to another when it makes everyone better-off and no one worse-off and
(ii) that people have rights that cannot permissibility be sacrificed in order to increase social
well-being. See AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIA L WELFARE (1970);
Amartya Sen, liberty, Unanimity and Rights, 43 ECONOMETRICA 217 (1976); Amartya Sen,
Personal Utilities and Public Judgments: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?, 89
ECON. J. 537 {1979) [hereinafter Sen, Personal Utilities}.
19. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at xviii, 52.
20. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1975) (defining
rights as "political trumps" capable of overriding the promotion of "collective goal[s]").
21. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at xviii-xix {"Most individuals - including
many of the philosophers we have queried - would not readily endorse a principle of fair
ness if doing so implies (as it does) that it may be deemed socially good to make everyone
worse-off.").
22. Against the bare possibility of rights-protecting rules that make everyone worse-off,
a rights theorist may of course protest that her particular theory would not have that conse
quence. According to Kaplow and Shaven, this protest affords no escape, for reasons
involving logical consistency. See ill. at 468 ("[l]f one embraces any notion of fairness, logical
consistency implies that one has thereby endorsed the view that adopting a legal rule that
makes everyone worse-off may well be good."). A rights theorist necessarily accepts the
principle that rights can sometimes prevail over considerations of welfare or utility, and if
this principle is a good one, then it ought to apply even in situations in which its application
would reduce everyone's well-being. If a theorist blanches from this conclusion, this reaction
suggests that she really does not accept the principle on which rights-based theories neces-
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I begin in Part I by accepting that question as framed. The short
answer is that nearly everything depends on how "well-being " and
being "better-off" are defined. At some points Kaplow and Shaven
appear to assume that each person's well-being is defined by her per
sonal rank ordering of possible states of affairs: a person is better-off
insofar as she occupies a state of affairs that she rationally prefers to
another state of affairs. Even if Kaplow and Shaven employed that
definition consistently, their arguments would not be wholly persua
sive. In imaginable cases, a society would behave wrongly if it created
a state of affairs in which every living member regarded herself as
better-off, but did so without regard to the implications for future
generations whose values and preferences are not yet formed.23
Imagine, for example, a society in which everyone prefers intellectual
and spiritual tranquility to a state of affairs in which freedoms of
speech and religion are recognized, precisely because those freedoms
might tend to subvert tranquility. Each would willingly trade her free
dom to unsettle others for an enforceable prohibition against others
roiling her, even though many would be unwilling unilaterally to
forego practices that might disturb others in the absence of legal
regulation and the assurance of reciprocity that it provides. Even in
such a case, what people contingently prefer (taken for the moment as
the measure of each's well-being) is not the exclusive measure of
choice-worthiness or what the Jaw ought to be.
To begin with, the interests of future generations need to be con
sidered24 - people as yet unborn, whose values and preferences are
likely to be shaped by the environment in which they are raised.25
Even if every living member of a society thought otherwise, it would
be wrong (from what I shall describe in Part III as an "impersonal "
moral standpoint) to deny future generations the background condi
tions necessary to develop a critical and self-critical perspective on
prevailing patterns of thought, ambition, and belief. More generally,
thought about future generations drives a wedge between what people
value or prefer, on the one hand, and what they have reason to value
or prefer, on the other. As I shall argue in Part III, moral argument is
ultimately argument about the force of reasons.
sarily rest - that principles of individual right are sometimes independent of and more im
portant than considerations of individual and social welfare. See icl. at 56.
23. See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES JN THE SUBVERSION OF
RATIONALITY 1 09-40 (1983) (discussing "adaptive preference formation" and arguing that
social policy should not be based solely on wants or preferences, independent of considera
tion of whether those wants or preferences were autonomously formed and are ethically de
fe nsible).
24. For discussion of the interests of unborn generations, see infra notes 1 68-169 and
accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., GARY s. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 16 (1996) (noting that
"[c]ulture exercises a sizable influence over preferences").
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Admittedly, however, cases in which rights-based theories would
call for overriding literally everyone's preferences are the most diffi
cult, testing ones for their defenders. If Kaplow and Shavell could sus
tain the equation of each person's well-being with that person's
ranked preferences, and if rights-based theories regularly called for
overriding everyone's preferences, then such theories would be diffi
cult to defend. But Kaplow and Shaven cannot consistently equate
each person's well-being with each's individual preference order
among possible states of affairs. The equation dissolves when they
move from their negative argument against rights-based theories to
their positive argument in favor of welfare economics.
As defined and championed by Kaplow and Shaven, welfare eco
nomics requires interpersonal comparisons of utility.26 On a narrow
view of the limits of economic analysis, economists can identify policy
changes that would make everyone better-off, but possess no distinc
tive capacity to make value judgments about the desirability of actions
that would make some people better-off while diminishing the well
being of others (unless well-being is implausibly equated solely with
money or wealth or otherwise measured by reference to an imagined
market in which the components of well-being are assigned a dollar
value).27 Kaplow and Shavell are more normatively ambitious. When
some people are made better-off and others worse-off, Kaplow and
Shaven insist that we need to make quantitative assessments, com
paring the gains in well-being of the winners with the losses of the
losers. But interpersonal comparisons are impossible without a sub
stantive definition of well-being as a specific good or package of goods
that each person possesses in measurable quantities - for example,
one that equates well-being with an experiential state such as happi
ness, or with the overall satisfaction of desires over a lifetime, or with
the possession of objectively valuable goods and opportunities. As I
shall argue at length, once well-being is given the kind of substantive
definition necessary to support meaningful interpersonal comparisons,
26. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 24 n.1 5 ("Implicit in any social welfare
function is a comparison of, and a way of trading off, different individuals' utilities.").
27. Richard Posner once championed the equation of social welfare with wealth maxi
mization. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical a11d Political Basis of the Efficie11cy Norm i11
Common Law Distrib11tio11, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 ( 1980); Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) [hereinafter
Posner, Utilitarianism]. This approach calls for increases and decreases in personal well
being to be measured by assigned prices, reflecting people's willingness to pay either to
achieve or to avoid particular outcomes. See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra. As Posner has
subsequently recognized, however, this approach is morally unattractive, because it makes
well-being "dependent on the assignment of property rights and . . . on the distribution of
wealth across persons." Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A
Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS Of TORT LAW 99-100 (David
Owen ed., 1 995). Kaplow and Shavell expressly reject the idea that individual well-being and
social welfare could be measured solely in terms of wealth. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra
note 3, at 35-36.
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a conceptual gap emerges between well-being and what everyone nec
essarily values most. On the most plausible substantive accounts,
each of us might sometimes value other things more than our own
well-being (as thus defined and measured). For example, we might
rationally value moral or aesthetic ideals more than any experiential
state, such as happiness,28 or more than the maximal satisfaction of our
changing desires over the course of our lives.
Part I also develops an important implication of the argument that
well-being - once given the kind of substantive definition that
welfare economics requires - is not necessarily what each of us values
most. Kaplow and Shavell rightly argue that a theory that weighs con
siderations other than well-being could dictate results that reduce
everyone's well-being. But their welfare economic approach invites a
symmetrical objection: if people can rationally value freedoms or
ideals more than their own well-being, then a theory that only consid
ers well-being could imaginably mandate the imposition of legal rules
that literally no one would choose.
Part II contests Kaplow and Shavell's argument that if people did
not know what positions they would occupy in society, they would
always choose legal rules based on their own anticipated well-being.
Part I I also challenges the assumption that imagined ex ante contracts
can always provide adequate justification for particular legal rules,
even when the contingently surrounding rule structure could not be
similarly justified.
Finally, Part III sketches the affirmative theory that is presupposed
by many of my criticisms in Parts I and I I. Building on earlier observa
tions, I explain when and why well-being matters in moral and legal
decisionmaking, but why other values sometimes matter more from
both a personal and a moral point of view. As Kaplow and Shavell
emphasize, some moral and legal rights have as their purpose the
promotion of human well-being. But Part III argues that other values
help to support other rights. Freedoms of speech and religion, in par
ticular, reflect the insight that well-being is not all that we have reason
to value, nor always what we have reason to value most. Part III also
argues that reasons, not well-being or utility, are the ultimate currency
of moral argument.
I should say a word at the outset about how my general approach
and conclusions compare with those of Kaplow and Shaven. Kaplow
and Shaven launch their sharpest attacks against moral theories that
purport to eschew appeal to consequences of any kind.29 Like them, I
28. As I explain in Part I I I, the realization of moral ideals may contribute to happiness
and well-being, but need not always do so, and in any event is not typically sought for the
sake of well-being. See infra notes 1 37-154 and accompanying text.
29. They furnish a particularly dramatic example, involving retributive theories of pun
ishment. As portrayed by Kaplow and Shavell, retributivists believe that punishment should
always match the severity of the predicate crime. See KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at
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am deeply skeptical of such theories. Indeed, I regard many of their
attacks on legal scholarship that presupposes the validity of such
theories as entirely convincing, even brilliant. I differ, however, in
denying that the only consequences that matter morally are conse
quences for human well-being, once the concept of well-being is sub
stantively defined.
I.

WELL-BEING: A C ONCEPT IN SEARCH O F A DE FINITION

At the heart of Kaplow and Shavell's argument lies a definitional
contrast between fairness or rights-based theories, on one hand, and
welfare economics on the other.30 In assessing legal rules, welfare eco
nomics, which Kaplow and Shaven commend, appeals only to consid
erations of individual well-being;31 it regards social welfare as an
increasing function of individual well-being.32 By contrast, they define
fairness or rights-based theories, which they condemn, as theories that
give weight to considerations other than individual well-being.33
According to Kaplow and Shavell, such theories err grievously by
threatening to diminish the well-being of literally everyone.34
Kaplow and Shaven expect all to agree that a policy would be
indefensible if it reduced everyone's well-being.35 This anticipated
agreement depends on a crucial assumption that everyone values well
being above all else. Upon reflection, however, it seems plain that
whether everyone would attach this priority to being well-off, or the
corresponding disvalue to being less well-off, depends on what well-

302. Retributivists believe that the imposition of a more severe sanction would violate the
rights of the person being punished, even if the more severe penalty would have an
overwhelmingly successful deterrent effect. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell assert, a consistent
retributivist would think it wrong for a legal system to establish a penalty that was dispropor
tionate to the severity of the underlying crime, even if the higher threatened sanction would
wholly eliminate commission of the crime and thus obviate the need for any punishment at
all. See icl. at 31 1 -13, 329-31.
30. See id. at 3 (framing this contrast).
31. See id. at 5 ("[A]dvocating the exclusive use of welfa re economics, as we do, is
equivalent to adopting the moral position that the design of the legal system should depend
solely on concerns fo r human welfare."); id. at 1 6 ("The hallmark of welfa re economics is
that policies are assessed exclusively in terms of their effects on the well-being of individu
als.").
32. See hi. at 24 ("(S]ocial welfare is postulated to be an increasing function of individu
als' well-being.").
33. See id. at 28 ("IO]ur definition of notions of fairness includes all principles - but
only those principles - that give weight to factors that are independent of individuals' well
being."): id. at 39 ("Notions of fairness have the property that evaluations relying on them
are not based exclusively - and sometimes are not dependent at all - on how legal policies
affect individuals' well-being." (emphasis omitted)).
34. See id. at 52-58 (developing this argument).
35. See id. at 468-69 ("[W]e suspect that the fact that any notion of fa irness may involve
making everyone worse off will be seen as troubling.").
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being is or what it means to say that everyone is better or worse-off.
To illustrate the point, suppose I stipulate that well-being consists of
having money,36 then argue that no one could reasonably support a
rule that would diminish everyone's monetary wealth, because such a
rule would make everyone worse-off. This argument would fail. If
well-being were defined as having money, people might sometimes
value other things more than an increment of well-being - freedom of
speech or religion, for example, or leisure, or cleaner air. Before we
can judge the value of well-being, we need to know what well-being is.
Here, however, a methodological challenge arises. Well-being is
not a concept with clear, pre-existing boundaries. The literature
abounds with rival definitions.37 To assess the claim that public policy
should be based solely on considerations of well-being, it is necessary
to consider two sets of questions. First, how do Kaplow and Shaven
define well-being, and is it plausible to think that law and public policy
should be based solely on well-being as they define it? Second, what
would be the best or most perspicuous account of well-being, and what
role should this conception play in the design of public policy?
In this Part, I am mostly concerned with how Kaplow and Shaven
define well-being and with whether well-being, as thus defined, is nec
essarily what everyone would value most. I deal more extensively with
the second question, involving the most perspicuous account of well
being and its relation to other values, in Part III.
A.

The Looseness ofKaplow and Sha ve/l's Definition

Surprisingly, in a book arguing that legal rules should be based
exclusively on considerations of well-being - and one repeatedly
excoriating fairness theorists for failing to define their terms precisely38

36. The equation of well-being with money would reHect a crude caricature of the equa·
tion of social welfa re with wealth, defined to include not only money but other goods capa
ble of being assigned monetary prices. Cf supra note 28 (discussing the measurement of
well-being).
37. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text (discussing conceptions of well-being
prominent in the literature). As indicated by these disputes, "well-being" occupies the cate
gory of "essentially contestable concepts." See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contestable Concepts,
56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 1 67, 1 67-68 ( 1 956) (using this terminology to
describe concepts that are at once evaluative and descriptive and have sufficiently diverse
criteria of application that no single, preferred definition can be extracted merely from
examination of ordinary usage); see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF
POLITICAL D ISCOURSE 10-44 (2d ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1 983) (1 974) (discussing essen
tially contested concepts).
38. See KAPLOW & SHA VELL. supra note 3, at 45 (asserting that "[i]t is frequently diffi
cult to ascertain what analysts mean when they discuss the fairness of legal rules" because
" [a]nalysts often use words like 'fairness' without defining them"); id. at 470 (criticizing pro
ponents of fairness for failing to meet the "basic test" of stating their principles with preci
sion).
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- Kaplow and Shavell give no clear account of what well-being is.39
They come closest to offering a definition on pages 18-19:
The notion of well-being used in welfare economics ... incorporates in a
positive way everything that an individual might value - goods and
services that the individual can consume, social and environmental
amenities, personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for
others, and so forth.... The only limit on what is included in well-being
is to be found in the minds of individuals themselves, not in the minds of
analysts.40

This formulation leaves open as much as it resolves. Although it
says that well-being "incorporates . . . everything that an individual
might value," it fails to specify how well-being does so. It suggests that
well-being is somehow relative to individuals, or resides in the minds
of individuals, but does not say wh at well-being is or by what states of
mind it should be measured.
The looseness of Kaplow and Shavell's definition proves important
when, not having pinned themselves down, they subsequently make
arguments that presuppose two very different, and ultimately incom
patible, measures of well-being. Their negative arguments against
rights-based moral theories presuppose what I shall term an "ordinal"
definition of well-being.41 Under an ordinal definition, a person's well
being depends entirely on her subjective ranking of the state of affairs
that she occupies, relative to other possible states of affairs, regardless
of the subjective basis for her preferences.42 But Kaplow and Shaven
make other arguments presupposing what I shall call a "substantive"
theory of well-being. In particular, they argue that decisionmakers
must make interpersonal comparisons of utility,43 in order to deter
mine, for example, whether one person's gain in well-being is large
enough to compensate for another's loss. As I shall explain,
interpersonal comparisons are impossible unless well-being is capable
of cardinal or quantitative - not merely ordinal - measurement.
More particularly, interpersonal comparisons require a substantive

39. In principle, Kaplow and Shavell recognize the importance of having well-being
clearly defined. See id. at 16 (noting "the central importance of the concept of well-being to
welfare economics"); id. at 409 (asserting that "understanding the meaning and breadth of
the concept of individuals' well-being is of central importance").
40. Id. at 18-1 9.
41. See, e.g., id. at 30 n.27 (asserting that people are made worse-off when "given less of
those things that they value more than the analyst does and more of those things that they
value less than the analyst does").
42. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS. ECONOMICS 83 n.3 (16th ed.
1 998) ("A statement such as 'Situation A is preferred to Situation B'
which does not re
quire that we know how much A is preferred to B
is called ordinal, or dimensionless.
Ordinal variables are ones that we can rank in order, but for which there is no measure of
the quantitative difference between the situations.").
-

-

43. See id. at 24 n.1 5.
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definition of well-being, as a particular good or package of goods that
each person possesses in varying, comparable quantities.
Confusion results from using the single term "well-being" to
encompass these different ordinal and substantive notions. The power
of Kaplow and Shavell's arguments against fairness theories arises
from their implicit reliance on an ordinal conception of well-being: if
everyone would rank state of affairs A as better than state of affairs B,
it is hard to defend a fairness theory that would mandate B rather than
A. But the welfare economic analysis that they champion requires a
substantive conception of well-being, not an ordinal one.44 What is
more, a substantive conception must equate well-being with a par
ticular good or package of goods - despite the possibility that the
maximum attainment of that good or package of goods is not what
every person, in her ordinal rankings, would value most. In other
words, each person's ordinal rankings of her own well-being might
reflect standards of valuation not captured by a transpersonal substan
tive conception of well-being - such as Kaplow and Shavell's welfare
economic analysis requires - that equates well-being with a
particular good or package of goods.

1.

The Inadequacy of an "Ordinal" Account of Well-Being

Under an ordinal measure, each person's well-being is defined by
her ranked preferences for certain states of affairs over others.45 If a
person prefers state of affairs A to state of affairs B, then her well
being is increased by a move from B to A, regardless of the grounds
for her preference. Certain passages in Fairness Versus Welfare sug
gest that Kaplow and Shaven mean to define well-being in just this
substantively empty way.46

44. Their version is thus an ambitious one, in both its positive and its normative dimen
sions. Cf SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS. supra note 42. at 83 (noting that "[e]conomists today
generally reject the notion of a cardinal, measurable utility" and conduct only the more lim
ited types of analyses permitted by ordinal measures of well-being).
45. Economists commonly assume that such a preference order can be constructed "by
first imposing rationality axioms on the decisionmaker's preferences and then analyzing the
consequences of these preferences for her choice behavior." ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL..
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 5 (1995). An alternative approach "treats the individual's choice
behavior as the primitive feature and proceeds by making assumptions directly concerning
this behavior." Id.; see also KEN BINMORE. GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
VOLUME I: PLAYING FAIR 105-06 ( 1 994) (noting that under a revealed preference approach
" [o]ne observes some of the choices that a player makes and then argues that he is making
choices as though he were equipped with a preference relation"); AMARTYA SEN,
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 1 2-13 (1 999) [hereinafter SEN. COMMODITIES] (observ
ing that the equation of utility with a choice function is common "in the modern economic
literature" and "goes back at least to the origin of the 'revealed preference' school" in a 1 938
article by Paul Samuelson).
46. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 19 n.8 (suggesting that well-being
should be defined in terms of "what the individuals under consideration really care about");
id. at 58 ("(I]t is virtually a tautology to assert that fa irness-based evaluation entails some
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As I noted in the Introduction, even if Kaplow and Shaven consis
tently defined well-being in this way, it would be a mistake to conclude
that a legal rule that reduced everyone's well-being (as thus defined)
should always be deemed morally unacceptable. To reach this conclu
sion, some admittedly peculiar cases need to be considered, because it
is hard to imagine how a rule dispreferred by literally everybody might
ever get implemented. But the question retains its interest as one of
moral right or wrong: even if every living person in a particular society
preferred state of affairs A to state of affairs B, could it ever be said,
from a detached or impersonal moral perspective, that A is morally
worse? To this question, for reasons that I shall explain more fully in
Part I I I, I believe the answer to be yes. Among the pertinent consid
erations are how existing preferences were formed and whether
decent opportunities existed for critical and self-critical reflection.47 In
the Introduction, I thus imagined a society in which every living
person would willingly· trade her freedoms of speech and religion for
the social and psychological tranquility expected to ensue from an
enforced orthodoxy. Despite the imagined consensus that free speech
would make everyone worse-off, I argued that it would be wrong for
the imagined society to enforce prohibitions against (or in some cases
to withhold) expression necessary to enable succeeding generations to
form relatively independent judgments about the kind of life most
worth living. Autonomy is a value of foundational moral importance.48
And respect for autonomy, in a morally important sense of the term,
requires the promotion of cultural conditions conducive to critical and
self-critical reflection.49
It might be objected that my rejection of unanimous agreement
among living members of a society as the ultimate test of moral
correctness depends on far-fetched cases and has little practical
salience: in virtually all cases likely to arise, surely rights-based
theories should be deemed unacceptable if they risk producing
outcomes that literally everybody would think worse than identifiable
alternatives. But the suggestion to ignore far-fetched cases lends no
sort of reduction in individuals' well-being, fo r notions of fairness are principles of evalua
tion that give weight to factors unrelated to individuals' well-being.").
47. On the moral relevance of the circumstances under which preferences are formed,
see, for example, ELSTER, supra note 23, at I 09-40.
48. On autonomy and its significance, see, for example, G ERALD DWORKIN, THE
THEORY AND PRACflCE OF AUTONOMY (1 988); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
72-81 , 1 99-200 (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
49. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Awonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876-78
( 1 994) [hereinafter Fallon, Two Senses] (distinguishing a "descriptive" sense of autonomy. as
a condition that exists as a matter of degree and is capable of promotion, from an "ascrip
tive" sense of autonomy that refers to the supposed metaphysical foundation of people's
rights to make decisions for themselves). When autonomy is used in the descriptive sense, it
"requires the capacity to reflect upon, order, and self-critically revise the tastes, passions,
and desires that present themselves as reasons for action." Id. at 887.
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support to Kaplow and Shavell's argument that rights-based theories
should be rejected because they·risk making everyone worse-off. On
the contrary, Kaplow and Shavell's argument requires far-fetched
cases to achieve any bite whatsoever.
If asked to rank their personal preferences, most fairness theorists
would presumably prefer living under fairness-based rules to living
under rules based entirely on other considerations. If so; and if well
being is defined ordinally by reference to each person's preferences
for states of affairs, then no legal rule that was preferred by even a
single fairness theorist could diminish everyone's well-being; if the
fairness theorist values fairness over other goods, then her well-being
will increase (under an ordinal definition of well-being) if fairness
based rules are adopted.so
Absent a more substantive definition of well-being, Kaplow and
Shavell's principal fresh argument against rights-based theories - that
they risk making everyone worse-off - thus succeeds only insofar as
rights-based rules are adopted for situations in which literally no one
thinks they ought to be adopted. This is a logically possible hazard, but
a somewhat other-worldly one. For Kaplow and Shavell's negative
arguments to work against real-world opponents, they need a substan
tive definition that both distinguishes well-being from other possible
grounds for choice and makes it possible to explain why everyone
would judge well-being to be more valuable than any other good such as the protection of rights or the promotion of fairness - for
which well-being might be sacrificed.
Of equal importance, Kaplow and Shaven need a substantive con
ception of well-being in order to carry out the welfare economic
analysis that they endorse. Their version of welfare economics re
quires interpersonal comparisons of well-being or utility.st If a change
in the prevailing legal rule would increase Smith's well-being but
diminish Jones's, Kaplow and Shaven maintain that we need to know
the size of Smith's gain in comparison with Jones's loss in order to
gauge the net effect on social welfare. In order to make the requisite
comparison, however, we need to look at something more than
Smith's and Jones's bare preference orderings. Interpersonal compari
sons presuppose that well-being comes in measurable quantities.
To get from preference orderings to commensurable units of well
being, it would be logically possible simply to assign numerical values

50. See Michael B. Dorf, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kap/ow and
Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 859 (2002) (noting that strong advocates of a fairness theory
will be made worse-off by the adoption of any other theory).
51. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 24 n.1 5 ("Implicit in any social welfare
function is a comparison of, and a way of trading off, different individuals' utilities.").
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to each person's ordinal preference rankings,52 perhaps ascribing a
value of one to the most preferred outcome and zero to �he least pre
ferred along some bounded scale, and then to make interpersonal
comparisons based on the. assigned numerical representations.53 As I
shall argue more fully in Part III, however, any effort to define and
measure well-being by equating it with preference orderings would
misdescribe both moral and psychological reality. We value diverse
goods in diverse ways and for diverse reasons; our own well-being which I shall loosely define in Part III by reference to the overall
quality of our psychological experience - is one good, but not the
only good that we may value. A person who sacrifices her life to save
"
others pursues a goal that she values more than her own well-being
not the greatest quantity of well-being, or indeed the greatest quantity
of anything else, that she is capable of attaining. In light of the variety
of reasons for which we may value goods and ideals, the equation of
well-being with numerical values assigned Jo ordinal. preference rank
ings would mischaracterize both well-being (which is not the only con
sideration underlying preference order�ngs) and the complex founda
tions of judgments of relative value (which need not .aim at the
.
maximization of any single good). This being so, the resulting numeri
cal comparisons would be too conceptually as well as epistemically ar
bitrary to serve as the sole relevant consideration in the design of legal
policies.54
Most philosophers and economists who support interpersonal
comparisons of well-being do not contend otherwise. Instead of
attempting to assign quantitative values to purely ordinal preference
rankings, they assume almost without exception that well-being must
be defined substantively, as something (such as happiness or the satis52. This is the approach famously advanced for the purpose of making intrapersonal
utility comparisons in JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSCAR MORGENSTERN. THE THEORY OF
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944).
53. See Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They
Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200, 215-16 (Jon
Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991) [hereinafter I NTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS] (consid
ering but rejecting this possibility).
54. See id. at 216 (arguing that if "some undemanding person . . . achieves his upper bound
at a low level of consumption," whereas a "greedy" person reaches his upper bound only al a
much higher level, "and if we distribute goods to each individual so that each achieves, say, 90%
of his maximum utility (which is now a well-defined utility level), then the greedy person is likely
to be given much more than one feels he deserves").
In arguing that numerical values assigned to ordinal preference rankings would be con
ceptually and epistemically arbitrary, I do not mean to deny that interpersonal comparisons
of well-being are possible. so long as well-being is defined in conceptually plausible terms
that permit interpersonal comparisons. For example, I accept that it is possible to make
rough interpersonal comparisons of experiential states or of the extent to which different
people possess objective goods. (If well-being were defined in those terms, I would.
however. maintain that well-being is not necessarily what everyone values most.) I mean
only to reject the possibility of quantitative interpersonal comparisons of well-being that are
based directly on ordinal preference orderings and exclude all other information.
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faction of desires, for example) that each person's preference rankings
seek to maximize, the attainment of which can be measured in quanti
tative terms.55 In much of their argument, Kaplow and Shaven accept
this approach. Somewhat surprisingly, they purport to be agnostic
about which substantive measure of well-being ought to be used,56
saying only that "legal policy analysis should be guided by reference to
some coherent way of aggregating individuals' well-being."57 Plainly,
however, selecting a "coherent way of aggregating individuals' well
being" will require the adoption of a substantive theory or measure of
well-being, such that each person can be said to possess some quantity
of it that can then be compared with every other person's.

2.

Su bstantive Accounts of Well-Being and Their Relation to Rational
Choice

Although necessary for the welfare economic analysis that Kaplow
and Shaven champion:, movement from an ordinal to a cardinal and
indeed to a substantive theory of well�being does not come without
cost to their argument. Once a substantive theory or measure of well
being is adopted, the claim that the greatest possible well-being is
necessarily what everyone values most - which is tautologically true
if each person's well-being is measured by her ordinal preference
rankings - ceases to be tenable.58 If well-being is defined substan
tively, it is always an open question whether any particular theory or
measure of well-being accurately captures what everyone values
most.59 If not, then a reduction in everyone's well-being, as thus
defined, might not be unacceptable after all (whether in rea·sonably
imaginable or in far-fetched cases). We would need to know what was
obtained instead.
.
In the philosophical and economic literature, the leading theories
of well-being cluster into three categories - objective list theories,

55. Cf BECKER, supra note 25, at 23 (advancing an economic model of rational choice
under which choices are assumed to be "forward-looking" and "maximizing").
56. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 27 n.22 (citing the literature discussing
whether interpersonal utility comparisons are possible and. if so, what common measure
ought to be used). For an introduction to some of the leading positions and central issues,
see I NTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS, supra note 53.
57. KA PLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 27.
58. See SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 45, at 2-3 ("[O)ne's view of one's own welfare
and the maximand in choice behaviour may each respectively be called 'utility' without great
difficulty, but if both are called 'utility' and treated as the same, then it would have been im
plicitly presumed that what one always maximizes is indeed one's own welfare.").
59. Cf GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 68-69 (Thomas Baldwin ed.,
rev. ed., with pref. to the 2d ed. and other papers 1 993) (objecting to efforts to equate
goodness with natural properties by noting that such efforts always leave open the question
about any particular natural property: "ls this good?").
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experiential theories, a nd preference-based theories.w Yet none es
tablishes well-being as a good that all rational people would always
value over other, sometimes competing, values. As I have suggested
already and shall argue more fully i n Part III, there are many goods,
choice among which can rationally rest on diverse grounds. We can,
and do, value things besides our own well-being (as defined by the
most plausible substantive measures).
"Objective list"61 theories hold that a person's well-being consists
of having certain goods and opportunities that are objectively
valuable, or that people have reason to desire, or that are typically
necessary or useful for a fulfilling life.62 Although otherwise u nclear
about what well-being is, Kaplow and Shaven reject objective list
theories, apparently because such theories leave too little room for
subjective valuation.63 In their view, both value and well-being are
relative to i ndividual tastes.64
A second leading approach equates well-being with an experiential
state such as pleasure or happiness.65 The appeal of experiential con
ceptions lies largely in their capacity to explain why everyone would
value well-being. Pleasure and happiness are plausibly viewed as states
that every normal person would regard as a good, both for herself and
for others.66 Pain seems equally to be an experiential state that
everyone, or nearly everyone, would wish to avoid, possibly for
reasons too basic to permit further explanation.

60. For substantially similar tripartite categorizations, albeit using slightly different
labels, see, for example, JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT,
AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 7-72 (1 986); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS
45-137 ( 1 996); Scanlon, supra note 1, at 99-119.
61. This label apparently traces to DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 (1 984).
62 See SUMNER, supra note
theories).

60,

at 45-80 (describing and critiquing various "objective"

63. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 29-30 n.27 ("[W)hen the analyst decides
which goods are primary . . . and what importance each is to have, and then weights them
differently from how the actual individuals in society weight them . . . individuals will be
made worse off . . . . Indeed. such . . . approaches sometimes would favor regimes under
which everyone is worse off.").
64. See id. (asserting that people are made worse-off when "given less of those things
that they value more than the analyst does and more of those things that they value less than
the analyst does").

65. This approach traces to JEREMY BENTHAM, AN I NTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION l l - 1 2 (J.H. Bums & H .L.A. Hart eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 1 970) ( 1780) (defining utility in terms of "pleasure" or "happiness"), and JOHN
STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM. ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT I , 6 (H.B. Acton ed., 1 972) ("The creed which accepts as
the foundation of morals, Utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness.").
66. See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note
our lives and have reason to do so.").

I,

at 97 ("We all care about the experiential quality of
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Even if certain experiential states are widely valued and others
disvalued, however, people commonly value things besides experien
tial states.67 John Stuart Mill thought it a better, more choice-worthy
life to be like "Socrates dissatisfied than a f ool satisfied."68 A person
taking this view might choose to live in a society protecting broad
freedom of speech, even if what was said made her less happy overall
than she would be in a society in which speech was sharply
constrained. To cite just one more example, at the end of his life,
Freud reportedly refused any drug stronger than aspirin, despite suf
fering excruciating pain, because he valued the capacity to think
clearly more than pleasure, happiness, or the avoidance of pain.69
A third kind of theory, defining well-being as the satisfaction of
desires or preferences,70 might seem to draw a tighter, even concep
tual, connection between individual well-being and what everyone
values most.71 To have a preference is to prefer that it be satisfied; and
it might seem to follow that everyone would place the highest value on
having her preferences as fully satisfied as possible. But this apparent
tautology depends on the assumption that preference satisfaction is
defined ordinally, measured by each person's rank ordering of possi-

67. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 13 (noting that "we desire things other than
states of mind"); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974) (arguing
that people would rationally refuse to surrender themselves to a machine designed to
produce pleasurable or satisfying states of consciousness because we value challenge and
achievement sometimes more than states of consciousness); cf KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra
note 3, at 18 ("Well-being is not restricted to hedonistic and materialistic enjoyment or to
any other named class of pleasures and pains.").
68. MILL, supra note 65, at 9. Curiously, Mill believed this view consistent with the defi
nition of well-being or utility as an experiential state, but critics have persuasively argued
otherwise. See H .B. Acton, Introduction to MILL, supra note 65, at ix, xiii-iv (asserting the
untenability of Mill's position).
69. See GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 8.
70. Leading works equating utility or well-being with the satisfaction of preferences or
desires include R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING (1981), Ha.rsanyi, supra note 1 6, at 54-56,
and J.A. Mirrlees, The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND,
supra note 16, at 63.
7 1 . Although Kaplow and Shavell do not expressly affirm a preference-satisfaction
account of well-being, much of their text invites the conclusion they in fact equate well-being
with the satisfaction of preferences. They say, for example, that, although they typically
assume well-being to be unambiguous, "if individuals do not understand how their situations
affect their well-being, our argument may be applied to individuals' actual well-being what they would prefer if they correctly understood how they would be affected." KAPLOW
AND SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 23. Jn the course of a long section. id. at 409-36, discussing
"preferences and individuals' well-being," they a·pprovingly cite authors who have claimed
that normative analysis should be based on "rational, fully informed preferences." Id. at 410
n.24. And they insist repeatedly that notions of fairness become relevant to welfare eco
nomic analysis insofar, but only insofar, as people have a "taste" or "preference" for fair
ness. See, e.g., id. at 431-36 (discussing "tastes for notions of fairness").
Kaplow and Shaven do not, however, expressly embrace a substantive conception of
well-being as preference satisfaction, and nothing in my argument depends on the assump
tion that they equate well-being with preference satisfaction.
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ble states of affairs.72 As I have argued already, however, individual
rank orderings are insufficient to support meaningful interpersonal
utility comparisons. Interpersonal comparisons require cardinal
measures of well-being, and the most plausible cardinal measures
presuppose a substantive conception of well-being as something lying
behind individual preference orderings - something that each person
gets more or less of as she moves from one ranked state of affairs to
another.
Once the requirement of quantification is introduced, I doubt that
there could be a coherent, substantive, ethically significant notion of
well-being as preference satisfaction that did not collapse into an ex
periential conception.73 On this view, to say that Jones's preferences
are better satisfied than Smith 's is just to say that Jones enjoys a better
experiential state, one of greater satisfaction. Lending support to this
interpretation, leading proponents of a preference-satisfaction concep
tion of well-being call f or well-being to be measured by reference
either to general laws of psychology74 or through thought experiments
in which an observer imagines others' psychological states and com
pares their intensity or satisfactoriness with her own.75 What is more, if
preference-satisfaction conceptions of well-being are not experiential
conceptions, then their ethical significance would seem doubtful. In
the absence of an experiential payoff, it is far from obvious that a
person's well-being is enhanced whenever her preferences are satis
fied, or that there is any ethical reason to aim to satisfy others' prefer
ences.76 Suppose, for example, that Jones prefers that Christians

72. See Sen, Personal Utilitie.v, supra note 18, at 551-52 ("[l]f utilities are defined entirely
in terms of choice, then a person will be seen as maximising his utility in every feasible
choice. But this assertion, then, is no more than a tautology."); Sen, Rational Fools, supra
note I , at 323 (observing that many economists assume that "the only way of understanding
a person's real preference is to examine his actual choices, and there is no choice
independent way of understanding someone's attitude towards alternatives").
73. Cf Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 1 09
YALE L.J. 1 65, 206-08 (1999) (noting arguments that preference-based theories must ulti
mately collapse into theories that equate well-being with either objective goods or an expe
riential state).
74. See Harsanyi, supra note 16, at SO (asserting that "any interpersonal utility
comparison is based on what I will call the similarity postulate . . . that, once proper allow
ances have been made for the empirically given diffe rences in taste, education, etc., between
me and another person, then it is reasonable for me to assume that our basic psychological
reactions to any given alternative will be otherwise much the same").
75. See HARE, supra note 70, at 128-29 (proposing a method of making interpersonal
comparisons that depends on "reduc[ing] comparisons between other people's preferences
to comparisons between our own").
76. See Adler & Posner, supra note 73, at 202-03 (endorsing a "restricted" preference or
desire-based account of well-being under which the mere satisfaction of a person's prefer
ences cannot be deemed to increase her well-being unless further conditions are satisfied,
including possibly a condition that. the person have a psychological experience of satisfac
tion).
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should always be given advantages over non-Christians. Suppose fur
ther that a Christian is given an advantage over a non-Christian, but
that Jones knows nothing about it and that the course of her life is
wholly unaffected. Although Jones's preference has been satisfied, I
find it implausible that her well-being is thereby increased. I find it
equally implausible that Jones's preference should count as a factor of
any ethical weight whatsoever in determining whether Christians
should be given advantages over non-Christians in situations that are
unknown to Jones and that leave her life unaffected. It is not of course
implausible to think that Jones's well-being would be increased if she
knew that a Christian received an advantage over a non-Christian and
if she felt a resulting sense of pleasure or gratification. But the need to
appeal to psychological experience supports the view that preference
satisfaction conceptions of well-being are ultimately experiential
ones, with preference satisfaction mattering only insofar as it contrib
utes to the quality of a person's psychological experience.77 If prefer
ence-satisfaction conceptions of well-being are actually experiential
conceptions, however, then they are vulnerable to the objection that I
raised earlier: we both can and sometimes do value the realization of
ideals more tha n maximizing personal psychological satisfaction.
Whether or not preference-satisfaction conceptions of well-being
are ultimately reducible to experiential conceptions, the notion that
everyone would accord the highest value or rank order to the maximal
satisfaction of her preferences, regardless of what those prefer
ences might be or become, dissolves upon a close examination of the
relationships among maximal preference satisfaction, choice, and
informed choice. As it turns out, there is a conceptual and sometimes
a practical difference between maximally satisfying a person's prefer
ences - once preference satisfaction is understood in substantive
terms, rather than measured by a person's ordinal ranking of states of
affairs - and giving a person what she would rationally choose for
herself.78
An example drawn from constitutional law will begin to illustrate
the complex relationships among maximal preference satisfaction,
choice, and informed choice. Suppose that legal analysts wish to de
termine when the government should be permitted to forbid political
speech that either advocates violation of the law or is likely to
encourage violation of the law.79 Suppose further, for sake of simplic-

77. See Scanlon, supra note 1 , at 100 (developing a similar argument).
78. For other arguments rejecting the equation of well-being with the maximal satisfac
tion of a person's preferences, regardless of what those preferences happen to be, see, for
example, SUMNER, supra note 60, at 134-35; Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 1, at 329.
79. The Supreme Court cases dealing with this issue are excerpted, summarized, and
analyzed in JESSE H. CHOPER, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., YALE KAMISAR, & STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 570-613 (9th ed. 2001 ).
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ity, that there are just three possible rules. Under a Bad Consequences
Rule, the government may punish speech whenever it has any ten
dency to promote consequences, however remote, that the govern
ment might reasonably deem harmful. Under a Clear and Present
Danger Rule,80 the government may punish speech only if it presents a
clear and present danger of serious harm. Under an Advocacy of
Imminent Illegality Rule, the government may not punish speech criti
cizing or urging resistance to laws and governmental policies unless
the speaker expressly advocates imminent illegal conduct and her ad
vocacy poses a serious risk of great, imminent harm.81 Suppose finally,
again for sake of simplicity, that the question is restricted to which of
these rules would best promote the well-being of a single person,
Jones.
We can imagine first that what would satisfy Jones's preferences
might be defined by what she, if asked, would actually choose. But
writers who equate well-being with preference satisfaction view this
approach as too simplistic.82 Among other things, the effect of the
various rules in promoting the satisfaction of Jones's preferences
would also depend on the rules' effects in, for example, promoting a
vibrant society, which we may assume that Jones would value, or
causing a breakdown of public order, which she would dislike. When
questions about likely consequences grow complex, many people lack
sufficient information to answer competently.
When people would be prone to make bad calculations, propo
nents of a preference satisfaction conception of well-being . typically
suggest that preference satisfaction (and thus a person's well-being) is
defined by what a person would choose if fully rational and fully
informed.83 This formulation is ambiguous, however. On one interpre
tation, it refe rs to what a person would choose if she were fully ra
tional and fully informed, with no consideration given to the fact that
she is not in actuality fully rational and fully informed. To see the im-

80. Cf Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 ( 1 919) ("The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent.").
81. Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 ( 1969) (articulating "the principle that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is di
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action").
82. See, e.g., H arsanyi, supra note 1 6, at 55 (insisting that "social utility must be defined
in terms of people's true prefe rences rather than in terms of their manifest preferences"); see
also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 23 (observing that "if individuals do not
understand how situations affect their well-being," calculations of well-being should be
based on "what they would prefer if they correctly understood how they would be af
fected").
83. See KAPLOW & SHAYELL, supra note 3, at 23; H arsanyi, supra note 16, at 55.
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plications of this position, consider, again, the case of Jones and the
three possible free speech rules, and imagine that the following
situation obtains : although Jones would actually choose the Bad
Consequences rule if asked, she would do so based on a miscalculation
of likely effects; if she were fully informed and fully rational, she
would see that the Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule would best
satisfy her fully informed and fully rational preferences.
If dispositive weight is given to what Jones would choose if fully ra
tional and informed, with no adjustment for the fact that she is not
fully rational and informed, adoption of the Advocacy of Imminent
Illegality Rule is the outcome that would maximally promote the
satisfaction of Jones's preferences. On this interpretation, however,
satisfying Jones 's "informed preferences" could not only frustrate her
actual or uninformed preferences, but also make her very unhappy. If
the Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule were adopted, we can
imagine that Jones would suffer anger and anxiety, due to her
misplaced fear of the consequences. Indeed, in light of this anger
and anxiety, we can imagine that she would be unhappier under the
Advoca cy of Imminent Illegality Rule than she would be under the
Bad Consequences Rule that she would actually choose if asked. If,
however, satisfying Jones's "informed preferences" can entail both
denying Jones what she would actually choose and making her
unhappier than she would be if she got what she would actually
choose, it seems plain that a conceptual gap exist� between a person's
well-being (as thus defined) and what a person could rationally value
most. In a case of this kind, a person could rationally choose to have
her actual choice respected, with the consequence that she would be
happier, rather than to be given what she would want if she were more
rational and better informed than she actually is.
Another interpretation would obviate this objection. According to
it, to satisfy a person's fully informed and rational preferences essen
tially means to give a person what she would want if she were fully in
formed and fully rational and if, in that state, she discounted for the
fact that she is not in actuality fully informed and fully rational. On
this interpretation, it is relevant that Jones would choose the
Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule if she were fully informed and
fully rational, but it is also relevant that she would experience anger
and anxiety if that rule were adopted. Under this interpretation, we
can thus imagine that although Jones would actually choose the Bad
Consequences Rule, and although she would choose the Advocacy of
Imminent Illegality Rule if she were perfectly informed and rational,
the rule that would best satisfy her partially mistaken and conflicted
preferences is the Clear and Present Danger Rule.
Although this is not a wholly implausible interpretation of prefer
ence satisfaction or of well-being, it has startlingly reductionist impli
cations if taken as a measure of what a rational person would always
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value most. According to this view, human agency in choosing does
not matter for its own sake, but only i nsofar as agency is valuable i n
getting preferences satisfied. I ndeed, it.is little exaggeration to say that
this conception reflects a view of human beings largely as engines for
the registration of preference satisfaction.84 The reductionist implica
tions of this interpretation of preference satisfaction make me doubt
ful that pref erence satisfaction, as thus defined, captures all that
people either do or ought to value.
Return to the example of the three possible free speech rules.
Now, however, imagine that Jones's actual choice is the Advocacy of
Imminent Illegality Rule. I believe that she might rationally adhere to
this choice even if she received and credited omniscient advice that the
Bad Consequences Rule, rather than the Advocacy of Imminent
Illegality Rule, would best promote the satisfaction of her preferences
over the course of her life. We can plausibly imagine Jones reasoning
as follows: if the Bad Consequences Rule were adopted, the society
would be well-ordered and tame, and over time she would develop a
set of i ncreasingly conventional prefe rences that would be extremely
well satisfied.85 When present and future preferences are both taken
into account, she might therefore achieve greater overall preference
satisfaction if her current preference for the Advocacy of Imminent
Illegality Rule were frustra ted a nd if she developed new, more readily
satisfiable preferences in the future. I ndeed, Jones recognizes (we may
imagine) that her possible future preferences would be so well satis
fied that she would la ter agree that the decision to adopt the Bad
Consequences Rule was the best one f or her. Nonetheless, Jones
would currently choose the Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule
because, looking to her own future, she would rather realize a norma
tive ideal, leading an intellectually challenged and challenging life,
tha n achieve the greatest possible quantum of preference satisfaction
over the course of her life.86
Under these circumstances, there is a clear distinction between
what Jones mi ght rationally choose and what would best promote the
fulfillment of her preferences over the course of her life. Quite imag
inably, Jones would rationally choose something other than the maxi
mal satisfaction of her "actual preferences . . . for so long as they
remain in existence and [her] new ones after [her] preferences have

84. This view is also startlingly paternalistic, at least in the context of a theory commit
ted to the view that "[t]he idea of an analyst substituting his or her own conception of what
individuals should value for the actual views of the individuals themselves conflicts with
individuals' basic autonomy and freedom." KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 421-22.
85. On adaptive preference formation, see ELSTER, supra note 23, at 1 09-40.
86. Cf ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 59-60 (1993)
(describing a person's concern "about the sort of person she will become" as "not a welfare
consideration," but nonetheless one that is capable of motivating rational choice).

February 2003)

Welfare Economics

1 001

changed. "87 To borrow again from Mill, she might rather live like
"Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."88
It might be objected that the imagined circumstances of Jones's
choice are peculiar, involving a narrow question about how a
preference-satisfaction conception of well-being ought to deal with
metapreferences, or even more particularly with potential collisions
between what R.M. Hare calls "now-for-then" and "then-for-then"
preferences.89 But the issue raised by a person's concern about the
kind of person she wants to be cuts deeper, revealing both a concep. tual and a psychological gap between maximal preference satisfaction
(as a measure of well-being) and what people could rationally value or
choose.
This gap is important. If well-being (defined substantively as
maximal preference satisfaction) is not the only thing that rational
people would value, and especially if it need not be what rational
people would always value above all else, then a theory that dimin
ished everyone's well-being should not be viewed as necessarily
unacceptable on that ground. It becomes important to ask whether
any particular non-welfarist theory gives people, instead of increments
of welfare, something that they might actually and rationally choose
instead.
B.

Welfare Economics and Outcomes That No body Would Choose

In developing my argument so far, I have not denied Kaplow and
Shavell's central logical claim: adoption of a moral theory that weighs
considerations other than well-being could result in the reduction of
some people's, or in extreme cases everybody's, utility.90 But if well
being is distinguished from what people might actually and rationally
choose, as I have argued that it should be, then a symmetrical objec
tion becomes available against welfare economic theories that con
sider nothing but well-being as defined by a substantive measure: a
theory that considered only well-being (defined substantively as an
experiential state or as preference satisfaction, for example) could
imaginably dictate the imposition of legal rules contrary to those that
literally everyone, except the dictator herself, would actually and ra
tionally choose.
Imagine, for example, that a question arises about how broadly to
define freedom of speech and religion. Imagine further that recogni
tion of a broad freedom would reduce everyone's .happiness or overall

87. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 418.
88. MILL, supra note 65, at 9.
89. See HARE, supra note 70, at 101-02.
90. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 52-58 (developing this argument).
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level of preference satisfaction in light of the contingently prevailing
conditions and distribution of psychological attitudes in a particular
society. For example, the more people heard or learned about what
others thought, the unhappier or more frustrated everyone might
grow, and the overall level of everyone's preference satisfaction might
diminish.91 Even on these suppositions, members of the imagined
society might reasonably choose a broad definition of protected
speech. To echo Mill again, they might rationalJy think it better to live
like "Socrates dissatisfied than a f ool satisfied."92
Nor is this the end of the difficulty f or Kaplow and Shavell's con
ception of welfare economics. As I argued above, Kaplow and Shaven
employ two conceptions of well-being. They embrace a version of
welfare economics that requires interpersonal comparisons of utility
and, accordingly, demands the adoption of a substantive conception of
well-being (such as happiness or preference satisfaction) that will
permit interpersonal comparisons. In criticizing rights-based theories,
however, they appear to employ an ordinal definition under which
people are better or worse-off depending on their personal rank
ordering of states of affairs. If I am right that welfare economics, using
one of the most plausible su bstantive measures of well-being, could
sometimes dictate legal rules that literally nobody would choose, then
Kaplow and Shavell's preferred approach stands guilty of precisely the
same charge that they lodge against fairness theories: it risks reducing
everyone's well-being as defined by an ordinal conception, reflecting
each person's rank ordering of possible states of affairs. Under an
ordinal measure of well-being, each might think herself worse-off if
denied what she would actually and rationally choose so that her hap
piness could be increased or the long-term satisfaction of her prefer
ences could be maximized (and her well-being thus enhanced under a
substantive measure).
Against these arguments, it might again be objected that if people
would choose to live like Socrates, dissatisfied, then being dissatisfied
must be what best satisfies their preferences. But as long as well-being
and preference satisfaction are defined in substantive terms, this
mildly paradoxical claim founders for reasons that I have discussed
already. People might recognize that if they began to live like f ools,
they would gradually acquire fools' preferences, which would then be
better satisfied than their Socratic preferences ever could be. If so,
they could rationally choose not to have their preferences maximally
satisfied.93

9.1 . See ELSTER, supra note 23, at 1 33-36 (developing a similar example as a criticism of
utilitarianism).
92. MILL, supra note 65, at 9.
93. Alternatively, a defender of the preference-satisfaction approach might argue that
satisfying people's preferences just means giving people what they would choose for
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Once it is recognized that welfare economic analysis could dictate
results contrary to what literally everyone would choose, Kaplow and
Shavell's principal negative argument against fairness theories
collapses. Yes, fairness theories could imaginably make everyone
worse-off (under an ordinal measure of well-being), but so could wel
f are economics. The choice between a fairness and a welfarist theory
must be m ade on some other ground.
II.

WELL-BEING AND EX ANTE CONTRACTS

In contending that well-being should be the sole concern in the
design of legal rules, Kaplow and Shaven rely on a positive argument,
not just the negative argument that fairness-based approaches could
diminish everyone's well-being. According to Kaplow and Shaven, if
people did not know their positions in society, they would always
choose legal rules based solely on their anticipated well-being.94 In the
view of m any analysts, this means that rational contractors, ex ante,
would always opt for the rule structure likely to produce the highest
average utility.95
Without rehearsing familiar debates about this issue, I would m ake
just two points. First, in order to assess what weight ex ante contrac
tors would attach to well-being, it is crucial to know how well-being is
defined. If, for example, well-being were defined in terms of happi-

themselves if fully informed and rational. In essence, this argument attempts to retreat from
a substantive to an ordinal conception of well-being, under which each person is deemed
better-off whenever she moves from a state of affairs that she ranks lower to one that she
would choose instead. As I have emphasized, however, the ordinal conception of well-being
that is employed by this test is not adequate for the welfa re economic analysis championed
by Kaplow and Shaven. For good reason, their version of welfare e�onomics calls for inter
personal comparisons of well-being, which in turn demand the kind of common metric that
only a substantive conception of well-being can provide. A purely ordinal conception of
well-being would also make it impossible to say that a person could be made better-off if her
preferences were changed, so that they could be more fully satisfied, even if the person does
not currently wish her prefe rences changed - notwithstanding the assertions of Kaplow and
Shavell that people's well-being could sometimes be improved if their preferences were
altered. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 416-17 (discussing scenarios in which
people would be better-off if their preferences were altered).
In addition, as I have argued already, this view would make it difficult if not impossible
to draw the sharp line that welfare economists wish to draw between well-being and fairness
based theories, at least in a world in which anyone values (a conception of) fairness: as long
as even a single theorist would rationally choose to live under a legal regime implementing
her views about fairness, it could not be said that that regime made everyone worse-off,
because the theorist herself would have to be viewed as better-off.
94. See id. at 442 ("We do not see a persuasive affirmative argument for an ex post view
that would trump policies that maximize individuals' well-being ex ante - policies that have
in fact received individuals' consent or that would receive it [in an ex ante bargaining situa
tion].").
95. See, e.g., Harsanyi, supra note 1 6, at 46; see also KAPLOW & SHAYELL, supra note 3,
at 442 (asserting that ex ante contractors would choose policies "that maximize individuals'
well-being ex ante").
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ness, rational ex ante contractors would not nece ssarily prefer rules
exclusively promoting happiness and, for example, according no inde
pendent significance to opportunities for the free development and
use of intellectual and moral faculties. Nor would such contractors
necessarily choose exclusively to maximize preference satisfaction,
insofar as there is a difference between satisfying people's preferences
and giving them what they would rationally choose for themselves.
It is more plausible, I think, to imagine that rational ex ante
contractors, if charged to select general principles of social justice (in
the way that Rawls, for example, imagines),96 might aim solely to pro
vide themselves with the most attractive bundle of what Rawls calls
primary goods97 - a rubric encompassing basic "rights and liberties,
opportunities and powers, income and wealth."98 Within Rawls's
framework, "primary goods are social background conditions and all
purpose means generally necessary for forming and rationally pursu
ing a conception of the good."99 He says explicitly, however, that "the
share of primary goods that citizens receive is not intended as a
measure of their psychological well-being."100
As I shall emphasize in Part III, I do not believe that principles of
social justice could be generated solely through instrumentally ra
tional, self-interested calculation. At least some moral principles must
be accepted as the provisional starting point for further moral thought.
My point for now is only that within the kind of framework that Rawls
imagines, the design of which reflects a number of moral commit
ments, rn• rational contractors would not necessarily choose to promote
a substantive conception of well-being above all else.
Second, it is far from obvious how much moral significance
attaches to imagined ex ante contracts concerning particular legal
rules when the totality of the surrounding rule structure could not also
be justified by a hypothetical ex ante contract. To be concrete, I doubt
very much that the legal rule structure currently prevailing in the
United States could be justified in its entirety by appeal to what
rational contractors would unanimously choose under fair and equal
bargaining conditions. Although I obviously cannot address these mat-

96. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 1 -1 7 (197 1 ) (defining justice in terms of
principles that would be unanimously agreed to by parties "in an initial situation that is
fa ir").
97. See ill. al 92.
98.

Id.

99. John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND,
supra note 16, at 1 59, 1 69 [hereinafter Rawls, Social Unity).
1 00.

Id.

at 1 69.

101. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS I, 8-9 (Norman
Daniels ed.. 1989) (arguing that Rawls's design of the so-called "original position"
presupposes a theory of the good).
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ters in depth, it is my strong belief that any plausible social contract
resulting from fair bargaining positions would produce much greater
distributive equality than currently exists. This would be true, I think,
even if rational contractors opted for the legal structure likely to
produce the greatest average utility (as measured, for example, by
happiness or preference satisfaction). Given the pla usible assumption
of the declining marginal utility of money,102 I think that greater dis
tributive equality would be mandated by the average utility pri nciple.
If the generally prevailing rule structure and its attendant distribu
tive inequalities could not be justified by hypothetical ex ante contract,
issues arise about whether particular rules could be justified
s uccessfully in this way. To take an admittedly charged example,
suppose that the q uestion is whether capital punishment should be
permitted, notwithstanding worries that some of those being executed
- for sake of argument, say one percent - are innocent. Suppose
further, again for sake of argument, that the death penalty is a highly
effective deterrent; because of it, hundreds fewer murders occur each
year than would happen otherwise. Under these hypothesized facts,
rational ex ante contractors would recognize that they are less likely to
be killed, except as punishment for crimes they actually commit, in a
legal regime with the death penalty than in one without the death
penalty. With the death penalty, there is a small chance that each will
be executed by the state for a crime she did not commit. But without
the death penalty, each stands a greater risk of being killed by a
private citizen (who might otherwise have been deterred).
In considering whether this ex ante calculation should determine
the appropriateness of capital punishment, the dramatically uneven
distribution of i ncome a nd opportunities is not obviously irreleva nt.
Those convicted of capital crimes tend disproportionately to come
from disadvantaged classes, as measured by income 103 and arguably by
race.104 This being so, a q uestion arises about whether it should be

1 02. The theory of declining marginal utility holds that "the additional satisfaction de
rived from an additional unit of a commodity" declines as a person consumes or acquires
more of that commodity. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, M ICROECONOMICS 75-76 (7th ed. 1 991).
As applied to money, the theory of declining marginal utility implies that an additional
dollar gives less satisfaction to a rich person than to a poorer person. See JONATHAN
BARON, MORALITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 1 60 (1 993) (characterizing the assumption of
the declining marginal utility of money as "[m]ore reasonable" than idternative assump
tions).
1 03. See Craig Haney, Tile Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and tile
logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 562-63 & n.35 (1995) (asserting "that
persons accused and convicted of capital murder are very often the victims of poverty" and
noting that "[tjhe widespread poverty of capital defendants is generally accepted and has
escaped much academic commentary").
104. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death
Penalty: Tile Need for the Racial Justice Act. 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519. 522-24 ( 1 995)
(summarizing various empirical studies and concluding that "the race of the defe ndant" is
crucial in determining who is charged with and convicted of capital crimes). Perhaps the
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deemed fair and acceptable to impose on persons who are disadvan
taged by society's failure to live by principles that would be chosen in
a fair bargaining position the further disadvantage of an elevated risk
of execution, possibly as punishment for crimes they did not commit.
The idea of an ex ante contract possesses ethical significance only as a
modeling device. The underlying assumption appears to be that a rule
is morally correct if it is "one which all could reasonably agree to and
none could reasonably reject,"105 even when the rule's actual effects on
particular people become known. If this is the ultimate touchstone of
moral correctness, however, I worry that an innocent, disadvantaged
person who was sentenced to death could reasonably reject the provi
sion for capital punishment on the ground that it requires her to sacri
fice too much for others in a context in which others are required to
sacrifice too little for her.'06
In presenting this concern, I do not mean to suggest that it is nec
essarily decisive. Although capital punishment is disproportionately
visited on members of disadvantaged classes, so are capital murders.
On the facts that I have hypothesized concerning the deterrent effects
of the death penalty, the disadvantaged as a group would suffer more
from the abolition of the death penalty, on average or as a statistical
matter, than would the wealthy. But suppose that murders of and by
disadvantaged persons could be prevented as effectively through full
employment programs as by the death penalty, and suppose further
that the disadvantaged would generally prefer full employment
programs to the death penalty as a policy for the reduction of murders.
This congeries of hypothesized considerations seems plainly relevant
to the design of legal policy, even if not dispositive of whether the

most famous study of the effect of race in the administration of the death penalty, David
Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia
Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983), found that the largest race-based
disparity in capital cases involved the race of the victim, not the race of the defendant.
Although black defendants were 1 .1 times more likely to receive a death sentence than other
defendants, defendants charged with the murder of a white were 4.3 times more likely to
receive capital sentences than those charged with murdering blacks. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that these statistics showed Georgia's administration of the death
penalty to be racially discriminatory and thus unconstitutional in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1 987). According to the Court, even if the statistics generated by the Baldus study
were accurate, they failed to establish that particular decisionmakers engaged in intentional
race-based decisionmaking. See id. at 292-93, 297.
1 05. T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND, supra note 16, at 122; cf. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 18 (1992)
[hereinafter SEN, INEQUALITY] (observing that Rawls's reliance on an ex ante bargaining
situation to generate principles of justice "can be seen as providing a specific structure for
determining what one can or cannot reasonably reject").
106. Cf. Scanlon, supra note 105. at 123 (observing that in assessing reasonable grounds
for the rejection of a principle, "our attention is naturally directed first to those who would
do worst under it," because "if anyone has reasonably grounds for objecting . . . it is likely to
be them").
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death penalty should be deemed to violate a moral or constit utional
right.
In their defense of welfare economics, Kaplow and Shaven insist,
probably correctly, that welfare economic analysis tends to do better
than most fairness-based approaches in broadening the frame in which
particular problems are analyzed.107 According to them, fairness
theories tend to adopt a post hoc, backward-looking perspective,
ignoring opportunities to establish rules that will m sximize fut ure
social welfare.108 By contrast, they say, welfare economics requires
analysts to consider which r ule structure will make things better in the
future.109
Against this claim, my point is only that nearly all legal analysis including that commended and conducted by Kaplow and Shaven operates under framing constraints,110 with many contingent elements
of the social, economic, and legal structure implicitly accepted as
given.111 Analysis thus proceeds on a second-best, not a first-best,
basis. I agree with Kaplow and Shavell that the optimal response to
distributive inequities would typically be to deal directly with distribu
tion.112 But in the absence of that response, there are inherent difficul
ties in second-best normative analysis, in part because decisions about
what to take as ''.given" are irreducibly contestable. Once the inevita
bility of contestable framing constraints is acknowledged, the norma
tive force of ex ante arguments attempting to justify particular rules is
considerably diminished, especially insofar as those rules impose
heavy b urdens on those who are already among the least advantaged
classes.
III. WELL-BEING, IMPERSONAL VALUE, AND CHOICE-WORTHINESS
Among the strands of argument that I have developed thus far, the
most insistent has been a simple one. Although it is often assumed that
1 07. See KAPLOW & SHA VELL, supra note 3, at 49 (characterizing welfare economics as
"superior" to fairness-based approaches on this basis).
1 08. See id. at 48 (asserting that assessments of fairness "are usually made from an ex
post perspective").
109. See id. at 49 (asserting that ex ante, welfare economic analysis "reflects a complete
consideration" of factors relevant to shaping future outcomes).
1 10. See id. at 32 ("[W]hen undertaking any kind of analysis, it is often useful to focus
on certain factors in order best to understand their effects, leaving other considerations
aside.").
1 1 1. See generally Daryl Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 1 1 1
YALE L.J. 1 3 1 1 (2002) (discussing the crucial importance of how issues in constitutional law
are framed).
1 12. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 33 ("[W]hen legal rules do have dis
tributive effects, the effects usually should not be counted as favoring or disfavoring the
rules because distributive objectives can often be best accomplished directly, using the
income tax and transfer (welfare) programs.").
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each of us values her own well-being above all else, this assumption
becomes highly questionable once well-being receives the substantive
content necessary to support policy analysis, including the welfare
economic calculations championed by Kaplow and Shaven. When
well-being is defined substantively, a potential gap emerges between
what would maximally promote people's well-being, as specified by a
substantive measure; and what some people might rationally choose.
In iight of this gap, a rule that diminishes well-being should not be
deemed necessarily unacceptable on that ground alone.
So far, however, I have not attempted to explain how or why
people might rationally value goals, aims, or outcomes other than their
own well-being (as defined by some substantive measure). Neither
have I discussed how the notion of well-being appropriately enters
into moral, political, or legal decisionmaking. Nor have I addressed
the implications of individual valuation for the definition and
enforcement of rights. In this Part, my aim is partly to remedy these
deficiencies. My goal is not to make an independent contribution to
moral and political philosophy. Much more modestly, I intend only to
sketch the kind of rights-based approach that I believe coheres best
with widely held beliefs about the nature of constitutional rights, to
def end its assumptions in contrast with those of Kaplow and Shavell's
version of welfare economics, and to demonstrate how it might
respond to some of Kaplow and Shavell's barbed challenges.
I begin in Section A by identifying the foundations of moral
thinking in an "impersonal" standpoint capable of furnishing distinc
tively moral reasons for action. The notion of a reason is fundamental
in moral analysis, more so than the desire of each for her own well
being, and Section A also discusses the role of reason in making judg
ments of choice-worthiness. Section B distinguishes people's pruden
tial interests in their own well-being, whi�h I define loosely as a
sequence of desirable experiential states, from other kinds of reasons
for valuing other goods. It also explains why our interests in our own
well-being have no categorical priority over reasons involving moral
and aesthetic ideals. Section C examines the significance of personal
conceptions of well-being from the impersonal perspective. It
maintains that some personal goals and satisfactions matter more than
others and that autonomy is a distinct, sometimes supervening value.
Section D def ends the idea of rights framed to promote values other
than welfare. Section E offers a concluding def ense of the moral
methodology on which my arguments in this Part rely.
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Foundations of Moral Thinking

As affirmed by a tradition of liberal or "impartialist" theories,113
the foundation of moral thought lies in an "impersonal standpoint"
from which each of us must recognize that, objectively speaking, we
are no more important than anyone else.114 Each of us is a conscious
being, capable of thought and experiential states; we all have goals,
values, and interests that give meaning to our lives. Much if not most
of the time, we pursue our goals and interests with unselfconscious
attention.115 But we can, and sometimes do, take a more distanced
view of our own situation. 116
When we adopt an impartial point of view, our own goals, values,
and interests do not lose significance for us. As Thomas Nagel puts it,
" [y]ou cannot sustain an impersonal indifference to the things in your
life which matter to you personally."1 17 Nonetheless, the impersonal
standpoint generates distinctively moral reasons for action, grounded
in the recognition that if I "matter impersonally, so does everyone"
else;118 if some or all of my goals, values, and interests matter impar
tially, then so do some or all of the goals, values, and interests of
others.119
From an impartial point of view, I thus recognize that because
others' lives matter as much as mine,120 it would be wrong for me to
•

1 13. See generally BRIAN BARRY, J USTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 217-33 (1 995) (discussing
"impartialist" theories). Kapfow and Shavell's reliance on arguments based on hypothetical
ex ante contracts, see supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text, reflects an implicit if not
explicit appeal to the notion of an impartial perspective.
1 14. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 10- 1 1 (199 1 ) [hereinafter NAGEL,
EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY]. It is beyond my ambition here to address the challenges

posed by nonimpartialist or nonegalitarian approaches, including perfectionist and virtue
based theories. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1 7 (Terence Irwin trans.,
1 985) (maintaining that "the human good turns out to be the soul's activity that expresses
virtue); FREIDRICH N I ETZSCHE, THE WILL To POWER § 766, at 403 (Walter Kaufmann ed.,
1 967) (terming it a "basic error" to "place the goal in the herd and not in single individu
als"). See generally THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM (1993) (reviewing and assessing theo
ries based on ideals of individual perfection).
1 15. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 10 ("Most of our ex
perience of the world, and most of our desires, belong to our individual point of view: We
see things from here, so to speak.").
1 16. See id. ("But we are also able to think about the world in abstraction from our particular position in it - in abstraction from who we are.:').
1 1 7. Id. at 1 1 .
1 18. Id.
1 19. See id. at 13 ("[W]e are pulled toward the conclusion that what happens to anyone
matters the same as if it had happened to anyone else.").
1 20. See id. at 10-12 (noting that from an impersonal point of view everyone is as impor
tant as the self appears from a personal standpoint).
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put others' lives recklessly at risk.121 I also recognize that I have reason
to sacrifice some of my own goals and interests to assist those with
more urgent needs.
In asserting that I have moral reasons, I use the term "reason" in a
broad sense encompassing any consideration that may count in favor
of an action or an assessment that an act ought (or ought not) to be
done.122 This usage assumes · that our assessments of choice-worthiness
reflect and are sensitive to reasons. It rejects Hume's celebrated claim
that "reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions."123 On
the Humean view, which loosely supports the claim of some econo
mists that we always act for the ultimate purpose of promoting our
own well-being,124 reason cannot tell us whether or how much we
ought to value others' lives or anything else; it can only calculate how
to achieve what we desire already. At a minimum, the Humean posi
tion is too strong.125 Our desires are subject not only to criticism, but
also to revision in the face of criticism.126 My desire to behave in cer
tain ways may diminish or even disappear if I become persuaded that
my desires are cruel or debased. It might then of course be said that
what is fundamental is my desire not to be cruel or debased;127 reason
simply tells me how to satisfy that desire. By no means, however, does
desire, viewed as antecedent to reason, always play the fundamental
motivational role that this objection assumes.128 Reason is frequently
crucial.

121. Kaplow and Shavell emphasize that attitudes such as this may be substantially or
even wholly the product of evolutionary biology and social conditioning. See KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 62-76; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 33-37 (1999) (attempting to explain moral sentiments and al
truistic behavior solely by reference to cultural conditioning and evolutionary biology). I do
not question that the origins of our moral sentiments may lie in these sources. But we are
capable of questioning our unreflective notions and determining whether they should be
altered or even abandoned in light of critical assessment. For further discussion of the role of
critical assessment in moral thinking, see infra notes 125-128, 1 92-1 97 and accompanying
text.
1 22 See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 1 7 { 1 998) [hereinafter
SCANLON, WHAT WE Owe] (characterizing "the idea of a reason as primitive" and capable
only of circular definition according to which "to be a reason for something" is to be "a con
sideration that counts in favor of it").
1 23. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 413-18 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxfo rd Univ. Press 1985) (1 739).
1 24. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
1 25. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE. supra note 122, at 20 (noting that the presupposi
tion of giving someone advice is that the person can think about what she has reason to do).
1 26. See NAGEL, supra note 2, at 142 (noting that people act and form desires "for
reasons, good and bad").
127. See SCANLON, WHAT WE Owe, supra note 122, at 54-55 (discussing efforts to de
fe nd a "desire model" of human behavior by "appeal to the idea of second-order desires").
1 28. See icl. at 41 -50 (asserting the fundamentality of reasons, not desires, in motivating
and justifying conduct).
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Suppose I see a student suffering acute emotional distress, note
that I could likely help her at only modest inconvenience to myself,
and pause to consider what to do. In a case s uch as this, it is s urely
conceivable that I might consider what course of action would best
promote my own happiness or satisfaction. But if I would derive hap
piness or satisfaction from helping the student, it would be because I
see this as what I o ught to do; As Thomas Scanlon has written, " [f]rom
a first-person point of view, the things that contribute to (one's own)
well-being are obviously important, b ut the concept of well-being
plays little role in explaining why they are important."129 To put the
point somewhat s ummarily, we do not typically value goods or activi
ties, nor do we choose them, because they contribute to our well
being. Rather, goods and activities contribute to our well-being be
cause we value them. 130
B ut why should I value the act of helping someone in distress, or
think it one that I o ught to do? To respond to this question, I m ust cite
reasons for thinking the act choice-worthy . I might say, for example,
that for anyone to be in great and undeserved distress is objectively
bad and that a person o ught to take steps to relieve great and
undeserved distress whenever she can do so at only modest inconven
ience to herself.131 This asserted reason is an impersonal one. It would
apply to anyone in a similar situation, not just to me.132
Someone else might disagree with my reasoning. The imagined
interlocutor might claim that I have no reasons unrelated to what is
good for me, or she might maintain that my moral obligations are
broader than I believe and that I have impersonally compelling
reasons to attempt to relieve distress even when the inconvenience to
me would be very great.133 In either case, we would have to press the
inqui.ry further, with each of us testing the other's proffered argu
ments. In the ensuing discussion, reasons, not utility or well-being,
would function as the fundamental metric of moral assessment.134 As
Nagel puts it, " [i]f we think at all, we m ust think of ourselves, indi-

129. lei. at 142.
130. See id. at 40 (concluding that "we should not take 'desires' to be a special source of
motivation, independent of our seeing things as reasons").
131. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 2, at 144 ("The objective badness of pain, for example, is
not some mysterious further property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason
for anyone capable of viewing the world objectively·to want it to stop.").
1 32. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 73 (discussing "the universality
of reason judgments").
133. This is the utilitarian view, according to which each person should do whatever
would maximize overall utility, without any special regard for herself or her personal
projects.
1 34. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 4 (characterizing "judgments of
right and wrong as judgments about reason and justification").
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vidually and collectively, as submitting to the order of reasons rather
than creating it."135
B.

Well-Being and Choice-Worthiness

When the personal and the impersonal standpoints are both
acknowledged, the notion of well-being is typically linked with the
personal point of view.136 This linkage is warranted in one important
respect: the well-being of any particular person is relative, at least in
part, to her particular goals, values, and interests.
In discussing personal goals, values, and interests, I cannot pause
to examine all the diverse kinds of things that we rationally value, the
diverse ways in which we value them,137 or our diverse reasons for
doing so.138 Suffice it to say that there are irreducibly many valuable
goods, including "objects and their properties (such as beauty),
persons, skills and talents, states of character, actions, accomplish
ments, activities and pursuits, relationships, and ideals. "139 In a short
hmnan life, none of us can address our attention to everything of
value, nor can we pursue every valuable activity to the fullest extent .
The need for choice is endemic to the human condition.
The diversity of goods and the variety of ways in which we can
value them underlay my repeated arguments in Part I that it is difficult
to give a plausible substantive account of well-being that reflects all of
what everyone might reason ably judge most choice-worthy. For
example, if well-being is defined as a desirable experiential state, we
might rationally value freedoms, or opportunities, or challenges more
than that experiential state. If well-being is defined as preference
satisfaction, we might value the pursuit of particular goals or ideals
more than h aving our preferences satisfied as fully as possible over the
course of our lives.

1 35. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD 143 (1 997) [hereinafter NAGEL, LAST
WORD]. Judge Posner appears to dispute this claim when he emphasizes what he takes to be
intractable moral disagreement as a ground for doubting both the validity of any moral
theory with objectivist pretensions and the capacity of reason to resolve ultimate claims of
right. POSNER, supra note 121 , at 10, 1 7-29. But Judge Posner acknowledges that
"[a)djudication is a normative activity," frequently requiring "normative reasoning," see id.
at ll2-13, and he advances a normative theory - which he calls "pragmatism" - prescrib
ing the kind of normative reasoning in which judges ought to engage. See id. at 240-65. His
arguments for pragmatism are framed for reasoned assessment; he assumes the competence
of reason to assess the validity of both of his claims and those that he debunks.
1 36. See Scanlon, supra note

I,

at 96 (noting this association in leading accounts).

1 37. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 99 ("[U)nderstanding the value
of something is not just a matter of knowing ltow valuable it is, but rather a matter of know
ing how to value it.").
1 38. See id. at 98 (asserting that "[t]here does not seem to be a single, reason-providing
property that is common to all" valued goods).
139. Id. at 95.
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To some, it appears natural and even irresistible to assume that for
each of us there is a single· highest good - our well-being, or what is
best for us personally - that a fully informed and rational person
would always choose.140 But the diversity of goods and the diversity of
the ways in which we value them render this view implausible. We
may value certain kinds of music because they make us feel happy, but
to adapt Bernard Williams's telling · phrase, ·anyone · who thinks he
should be a loving spouse for the sake of his own happiness or well
being has "one thought too many."141
As I suggested in Part I,142 a fully informed and rational person
might choose among differently valuable goods or activities on alter
native bases that resist amalgamation.'43 To cite just two among many
possible grounds for choice, a rational person might base her decision
about what profession to pursue, for example, on loosely prudential
considerations, aiming to achieve the most happiness or greatest sum
of satisfaction over her life as a whole.144 Or she might pursue a
normative ideal, opting not for the promise of happiness or even
satisfactions but for what she deems choice-worthy on moral or aes
thetic grounds.145 Doing what is adjudged choice-worthy in this sense
brings no guarantees of satisfaction. The person who chooses to try to
live like Socrates may end up very dissatisfied indeed, yet still think
her choice the best one.
The distinction between prudential concerns and other reasons for
action grows even more stark when the .impersonal point of view
intrudes itself. Sometimes I experience the demands generated by the
impartial point of view -. for example, to render aid to others - as
requiring me to suffer diminutions in my personal comfort and in the
quality of my psychological experience.146 Occupying the personal

1 40. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 25, at 22-23 (equating rationality with behavior that
maximizes personal utility); BENTHAM, supra note 65, at 100 (asserting that "pleasure is . . .
the only good").
141. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 1 8 (1981).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69, 85-89.
143. See, e.g., SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 45, at 1 3 ("Whether the binary relation of
choice can possibly be seen as reflecting the person's well-being must depend on the motiva
tions that underlie choice. There is an enormous difference between choosing tea or coffee
according to one's taste (and concern for personal well-being), and choosing to join, or not
to join, a strike, taking note, inter alia, of obligations to others; or working hard or giving to
charity out of sympathy or commitment." (footnotes omitted)).
1 44. See, e.g., HARE, supra note 70, at 1 05 (characterizing it as a "requirement of
prudence . . . that we should always have a dominant or overriding preference now" for the
satisfaction of our own current and future preferences).
1 45. See Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 1 , at 329 (discussing "commitment" as a basis
for choice distinct from personal well-being).
146. According to Nagel, the master problem of moral and political theory is to find a
way to reconcile "the inner conflict" experienced by people who simultaneously occupy both
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point of view, I may feel worse-off, not better-off, after making some
of the small sacrifices that I sometimes make.147 Yet I believe that I
have moral reason to make those sacrifices.148 I feel admiration and
sometimes awe when I note the much l arger sacrifices of comfort,
health, and even life that others sometimes make in order to promote
such impersonal values as the health, lives, and liberty of strangers.149
Once the distinction · between prudence and ideals of moral or
aesthetic choice-worthiness is recognized,150 I believe that two conclu
sions follow. First, the bare idea of rationality establishes no lexical
priority among prudential reasons and reasons for action involving
moral or aesthetic ideals.151 Second, as between these two possible
bases for choice, the notion of well-being fits better with prudence.152
To have well-being is to be well ;153 and our interest in being well, both
physically and psychologically, is precisely what moral and aesthetic
ideals someti mes demand that we sho uld sacrifice. It wo uld diminish
moral and intellectual clarity, not enhance it, to insist that a person
who died trying to save another, or to end an unjust practice, or to

impersonal and personal standpoints "that is acceptable to everyone in light of the univer
sality of that conflict." NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 17-18.
147. This is a contingent psychological claim. I do not mean to deny that fulfilling per
ceived moral duties is sometimes or perhaps even typically psychologically rewarding.
1 48. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 114, at 85 ("Impartiality pro
vides quintessentially agent-neutral reasons - reasons to want something independent of
your point of view.").
1 49. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 160 ("It is not that death could never be better than
dishonour, but rather that it is hard any longer to see the relevant notion of dishonour solely
under the heading of prudence.").
1 50. In arguing that a distinction exists between personal goals and projects, on the one
hand, and the felt dictates of impersonal reason, on the other, I do not mean to deny that the
border separating the two may blur. Admittedly, some of the goals and · projects most
fe rvently embraced from a personal standpoint may involve the well-being of others. It may
be a personal goal to advance the interests of one's children or colleagues, see, e.g., NAGEL,
EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 1 09-10 (noting "the special interest people
take in their relatives, especially their children," and viewing this interest as being in partial
tension with the dictates of an impersonal standpoint), or, at the extreme, to ensure justice
- as defined from the impersonal point of view - for a particular group. But blurry edges
do not collapse the distinction. The impersonal standpoint generates demands, and reasons
for action, that call for the sacrifice of personal well-being.
151. See SUMNER, supra note 60, at 1 88-89 (noting that practical reason must resolve
conflicts between ethical and other values and that "[p]luralism . . . seems to be the right
story about practical rationality"); cf. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 508 (7th
ed. 1 907) (asserting that in cases of "conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason,
being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side" and that "the conflict
would have to be decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two groups
of non-rational impulses").
152. See GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 72 ("If we are interested . . . in the conception of
well-being needed by moral theory, it seems that it must be the one supplied by the pruden
tial value theory.").
153. See SEN, INEQUALITY, supra note 105, at 39 ("The well-being of a person can be
seen in terms of the quality (the 'well-ness,' as it were) of the person's being.").
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make the world a safer place was really j ust pursuing her own well
being.154 What is more, as I argued in Part I,155 measurements of a
person's well-being solely by reference to her own ordinal preference
rankings assumes a conception of well-being under which interper
sonal comparisons are impossible.
In view of these considerations, although I do not have a fully
worked out conception of well-being, I conclude that the best s ubstan
tive conception will be a loosely prudential one. I shall therefore use
the term accordingly, in the remainder of this Part, as I attempt to
sketch the relation between well-being and other values. Roughly
speaking, when I say "well-being," I shall hereafter mean to refer to a
sequence of diverse but desirable experiential states, including, but not
limited to, happiness and satisfaction, over the co urse of a complete
life. In these terms, people's well-being is enhanced insofar as they
experience more desirable experiential states, or a higher average
level of experiential q uality, over their lives.
I emphasize, however, that when I use the term "well-being" in this
way, I do not mean to imply that each of us would always regard the
promotion of our own well-being as the most important or choice
worthy aim, even for us. In deciding what we have most reason to do,
all things considered, we sometimes have to weigh our interests in o ur
own well-being against other considerations that bear on choice
worthiness. These include both impersonally defined moral obliga
tions and personal ideals of the kind of life we think most worth lead
ing, even when attempting to meet those ideals would render us
unhappy or otherwise unsatisfied.
C.

Personal Conceptions of Well-Being from the
Impersonal Point of View

Because the impersonal point of view does not simply efface the
personal point of view, among the greatest challenges for moral
thinking is to achieve a reconciliation or accommodation of the per
sonal and impersonal standpoints.156 As a psychological matter, few if
any of us could accept that others' interests, projects, and well-being
have as m uch claim on us as our own.157

1 54. See SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 45, at 1 3 (noting that the equation of well
being with choice fails to acknowledge crucial differences in motivations for choice).
1 55. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
1 56. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 15 (terming "conflict"
between the personal and impersonal standpoints "a further problem for ethical and political
theory - a new set of data for which a theory must be constructed").
157. See id. at 18 (noting that "the special concern with how one's own life goes cannot
abolished" and suggesting that moral and political theory must accommodate this psy
chological reality); cf RAWLS, supra note 96, at 176-78 (observing that principles of justice
should be selected partly in light of "general facts of moral psychology" indicating that it is
be
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According to utilitarian thinkers, when we attempt to occupy an
impersonal standpoint, what we discover is simply a reason to treat
others' well-being, as they understand it, as being as important as our
own.ts!! Kaplow and Shaven advance a very similar claim: legal and
social policy should be based exclusively on calculations of social wel
fare, with social welfare defined as a positive, increasing function of
the well-being of individuals.159 But this formulation is at once too
broad and too narrow.
It is too broad because it fails to recognize the inherently moral,
and thus judgmental, character of the impersonal sta ndpoint. When
we assume an impersonal point of view, we accept that there are limits
on what we can reasonably demand of others.16() By the same token,
we adopt a perspective from which to assess what others can reasona
bly demand from us, from each other, and from the legal system. To
some extent , impersonal moral thinking may incorporate the goals and
interests that we (a nd others) embrace from a personal standpoint.161
Nonetheless, there is no reason to assume that impersonal moral
thinking will simply absorb everyone's goals a nd interests or make the
promotion of individual well-being (as I have now loosely defined it)
its undifferentiated goal.
If a person is starving or suffering from a physical injury, she can
reasonably demand that others come to her aid, as long as they can do
so without too much cost or risk to themselves. From the impersonal
point of view, her life a nd her freedom from physical agony possess
objective value, as do everyone else's. Matters would be different,
however, if a person wanted help in afflicting others on the basis of
race or religion, even if such assistance would bring her great psycho
logical gratification and even if she would prefer help in that cause to
being given a decent diet. I n the case of an antisocial preference such
as this, it is not merely that others' interests in avoiding affliction
sometimes difficult or impossible for people not to value their own interests over the good of
the community).
158. See SIDGWICK, supra note 1 5 1 , at 492 ("[A] Utilitarian must hold that it is always
wrong for a man knowingly to do anything other than what he believes to be most conducive
to Universal Happiness."); WILLIAMS, supra note 1 4 1 , at 14 ("A man who has . . . a [central]
project will be required by Utilitarianism to give up what it requires in a given case just if
that conflicts with what he is required to do as an impersonal utility-maximizer . . . ."). See
generally BARRY, supra note 1 13, at 2 1 7-33 (discussing utilitarianism as an "impartialist"
theory positing a general obligation to promote the general welfare).
I 59. See KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 24 ("[S]ocial welfare is postulated to be
an increasing function of individuals' well-being and to depend on no other factors.").
1 60. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 37 (noting that
"[e]ach of us has a primary attachment to his own personal interests, projects, and commit
ments, but this is restrained by our occupation of the impersonal standpoint . . . . ).
"

161. See id. at 65 (asserting that from the impersonal point of view we "take as our pre
liminary guide to the value" of what happens to each person "the value which it has from"
that person's point of view).
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would carry decisive weight in the moral balance. Even if those
interests could be put to one side, a personal goal (or even ideal) of
harming others would exert no morally colorable claim on others'
time, energy, or resources.162 From an impersonal point of view, some
personal goals and interests matter more than others, while others
matter not at all, and not merely because of the extent to which they
contribute to a person's experienced happiness, satisfaction, or well
being.163
The notion that public policy should be based solely on calcula
tions of well-being is also too narrow. From an impersonal point of
view, we are not merely sentient creatures, capable of achieving expe
riential states or having our preferences satisfied; we are moral agents,
able to develop and pursue independent conceptions of what is good
and choice-worthy. Partly independent of our well-being are our
interests in exercising moral powers of valuation and choice. 164 Our
lives and status are demeaned if we lack opportunities as well as the
resources to make critical judgments about the kind of people we want
to be and the kinds of lives we ought to lead, even if our choices make
us less happy or satisfied than we might otherwise have been.165 This, I
believe, is the premise underlying the familiar assumption that rights
of speech and religion, in particular, have some capacity to resist the
claims of individual well-being and social welfare. We value for
ourselves, and we owe to others, the basic liberties necessary to
develop and pursue independent conceptions of choice-worthy lives.166
I should emphasize that although my stance here reflects what is
commonly affirmed from a personal standpoint, it also claims to be an
objective one, grounded in an impersonal point of view, and thus not
dependent on what most members of any particular society would

1 62. Cf T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 659-60 (1975)
[hereinafter Scanlon, Preference and Urgency] (asserting that "[t]he fact that someone would
be willing to fo rego a decent diet in order to build a monument to his god does not mean
that his claim on others for aid in his project has the same strength as a claim for aid in
obtaining enough to eat (even assuming that the sacrifice required of others would be the
same)" ).
1 63. See NAGEL, supra note 2, at 167-71 (so arguing); see also BARRY, supra note 1 13, at
1 60-88 (discussing prominently asserted grounds for denying that some values or concep
tions of the good provide impartial reasons).
1 64. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 1 22, at 105-06 (asserting that "appreci
ating the value of human life must involv[e] recognizing and respecting" the capacities to
"select among the various ways there is reason to want a life to go" and "to govern and live
that life in an active sense").
1 65. See Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction to UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND, supra note 16, at 1, 1 3 (distinguishing the value of the capacity to choose from the
value of the thing chosen).
166. This, roughly, is the idea underlying Rawls's claim that the best measure of social
justice is the distribution of primary goods, not well-being or utility as each person conceives
it. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing primary goods).
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deem choice-worthy.167 Even if all members of some society would
choose to live like Mill's fools, satisfied, and to stifle free speech in
service of their aims, freedom of speech would retain its impersonal
value. As I have noted already, among the reasons that currently
prevailing preferences cannot by themselves establish what is right is
that, from an impersonal point of view, the interests of unborn
generations also count.168 Because the existence of unborn generations
is contingent, so are their utility functions. Predictions might be
possible, but more is at stake. Even if (as is imaginable) people
brought up without freedom of speech would value it less than people
born into a free society, and even if the current generation would
prefer to limit or abandon freedom of speech, the living would owe
freedom of speech to those who will come after, to enable them to
form their own, informed, independent ideals.169
In claims such as this, Kaplow and Shaven believe they catch the
scent of moral elitism and potential tyranny.170 But tyranny by the
majority, or by social utility functions, is as conceptually possible as
tyranny by self-styled moral elites. Recall my argument in Part 1171 that
the maximization of certain substantive conceptions of well-being,
such as happiness or preference satisfaction, could imaginably produce
outcomes that literally no one would choose.172 In principle, Kaplow
and Shaven are as open to charges of potential tyranny as those
against whom they lodge the accusation.173 The charges are empty in

167. The relevant sense of objectivity may be either stronger or weaker. Cf. Scanlon,
Preference and Urgency, supra note 162, at 658 (defining "an objective criterion" as one
"that provides a basis for appraisal of a person's level of well-being which is independent of
that person's tastes and interests" even if the criterion is "socially relative").
168. See generally PARFIT, supra note 61, at 351-441 (discussing myriad problems
presented in attempting to fit unborn generations into an acceptable moral framework).
1 69. I do not mean to suggest that the formation of ideals could ever be entirely uncon
ditioned. See NAGEL, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that critical reflection can never wholly
transcend "the unchosen sources of our most autonomous efforts" and that the critical per
spective that "seems to offer greater control also reveals the ultimate givenness of the self').
The "ultimate givenness of the self' does not make autonomy a nonsensical ideal, but it does
suggest that "autonomy" - insofa r as the concept is used in a descriptive sense - "is a
matter of degree." Fallon, Two Senses, supra note 49, at 877.
1 70. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 421 -22 ("The idea of an analyst substi
tuting his or her own conception of what individuals should value for the actual views of the
individuals themselves conflicts with individuals' basic autonomy and freedom.").
1 7 1 . See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
172. See generally Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons,
in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS, supra note 53, at 1 7, 43 (developing a similar criticism of
an approach under which policies should be based on people's hypothetical "fully informed"
references).
173. See Joseph William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 103, 125 (2002) (asserting that Kaplow and Shavell's approach would "impose . . .
rules on people against their wishes on the ground that, if people thought it through, this is
what they would want").
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both cases, however, until supplied with a substantive foundation in
moral argument. The identification of tyranny requires a moral
baseline, and to establish a moral baseline takes moral argument.
Simply to note the views, preferences, or utility functions of the
majority proves nothing.174
I have maintained that moral premises emerge directly from an
impersonal point of view that each of us is capable of adopting. This is
admittedly a contestable claim. As should now be clear, however, it is
not a claim that Kaplow and Shavell can reject,. at least when put in
general terms: they too rely on an analogue of the impersonal point of
view, as suggested by their appeals to what rational parties would
choose ex ante.175 They differ from me not in denying that there is a
distinctively moral perspective, characterized by its impartiality, but in
their assessment of what emerges from that perspective. According to
them, the premise emerges that the sole and ultimate moral good lies
in the promotion of the general welfare, as defined by currently pre
vailing tastes or preferences.176 l have argued that other values matter
too.
1 74. See, e.g., H arsanyi, supra note 16, at 61 (acknowledging that "the concept of ration
ality alone" will not "yield a useful ethical theory" in the absence of "a commitment to a
humanitarian morality").
Mill once argued that the moral significance of the general well-being followed as a con
sequence of each person's nonmoral desire for her own well-being: "[E]ach person's happi
ness is a good to that �rson, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate
of all persons." M ILL, supra note 65, at 33. But this reasoning is fallacious. As Sidgwick
objected, "an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a diffe rent part of the gen
eral happiness, does not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any
individual." SIDGWJCK, supra note 151, at 388.
On the surface, it might appear that some contractualist moral theories attempt to derive
morality from principles of purely rational, self-interested choice. See, e.g., DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 9 (1984) (attempting to derive morality from "the
application of the maximizing conception of rationality to certain structures of interaction"
by arguing that " [a]greed mutual constraint is the rational response to these structures");
RAWLS, supra note 96, at 12-14 (defining justice by reference to principles that would be
chosen by "rational and mutually disinterested" parties, "conceived as not taking an interest
in one another's interests," and with their rationality "interpreted as far as possible in the
narrow sense. standard in economic theory"). But for unanimous, self-interested agreement
on principles of justice to be even plausibly attainable, fair or ideal choice conditions need to
be specified. There is no way to generate those conditions without reliance on morally
shaped notions of fairness or reasonableness. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY,
supra note 114, at 39 (observing that what a party to a hypothetical contracting situation
could reasonably reject as insufficiently responsive to her own goals or interests is "a moral
issue 'all the way down' ").
175. See KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 442 ("We do not see a persuasive
affirmative argument for an ex post view that would trump policies that maximize individu
als' well-being ex ante - policies that have in fact received individuals' consent or that
would receive it [in an ex ante bargaining situation).").
176. See id. at 26 ("[T]o adopt welfare economics is to adopt the general moral position
that one should be concerned, positively and exclusively, with individuals' well-being.").
Kaplow and Shavell assert that there is an affinity between their arguments criticizing
fa irness theories and the critical arguments offered by Judge Posner, see POSNER, supra note
121, debunking the pretensions of what he calls "moral theory." But if Judge Posner's argu
ments were valid, they would tell equally against the moral theory offered by Kaplow and
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Rights

Within the account that I have offered, the point of rights - in
morals and to some extent in constitutional law - is to protect or
promote goods and opportunities that, from an impersonal standpoint,
are adjudged valuable and that are needful of protection or promo
tion. As Scanlon once wrote, to be persuasive a claim of moral right
must generally be backed by (i) "an empirical claim about how indi
viduals would behave or how institutions would work in the absence of
this particular assignment of rights," (ii) a value-based claim that "this
result would be unacceptable," and (iii) a further empirical claim
about how "the envisaged assignment of rights will produce a differ
ent" and better outcome.177
Attempts to derive constitutional rights commonly proceed on a
similar basis. As I have argued elsewhere,178 our constitutional practice
pervasively presupposes that rights reflect "interests," with the term
"interests" representing those personal values that retain their impor
tance from an impersonal standpoint. To provide only the sketchiest
illustration, First Amendment analysis often presupposes that people
have interests in being able to express themselves and in having access
to information and ideas.179 In some cases, however, other interests
may weigh on the other side. If Jones wants to express herself to Smith
by picketing outside Smith's home, interests in privacy must also be
taken into account. 180
The balancing of competing considerations ne ed not occur on a
case-by-case basis. We frequently get better consequences overall by
laying down clear rules and abiding by them.181 For example, we might
Shavell, which maintains that welfare economics supplies the uniquely morally correct an
swers to questions of social justice. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 5
("[A]dvocating the exclusive use of welfare economics, as we do, is equivalent to adopting
the moral position that the design of the legal system should be based solely on concerns for
human welfare.").
1 77. T.M. Scanlon, Rights, Goals, and Fairness, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 43,
103 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1 978). Scanlon appears subsequently to have changed his view.
See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 1 22, at 106-07 (maintaining that considerations
of right and wrong should play "a more fundamental role" in defining what we owe to each
other than they are permitted to play by "consequentialism, according to which ideas of
right, wrong, and obligation are made subservient to a purely teleological conception of the
good").
1 78. See Fallon, supra note 10.
1 79. See icl. at 372 (noting the role of such interests in supporting the conclusion that flag
burning is protected speech).
1 80. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474. 484 (1988) (upholding an ordinance barring tar
geted picketing of homes in light of "[t]he state's interest in protecting the well-being, tran
quility, and privacy of the home").
1 8 1 . See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 1 35-66 (1991 )
(exploring the reasons for reliance on rules).
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conclude that criticism of governmental policies should never be pro
hibitable on the basis of content unless it expressly advocates immi
nent violence and is likely to produce imminent violence,182 even
though some criticisms of · the government that receive protection
under this rule may produce very harmful results. In some uses of the
term, to say that someone has a "right" means that she enjoys the pro
tection of a constitutional rule.183
It perhaps bears emphasis that welfare economics, as championed
by Kaplow and Shaven, does not preclude the possibility of either
moral or constitutional rights, based on a calculation of likely conse
quences. But Kaplow and Shaven would restrict the consequences that
matter to those involving individual well-being.184 As I have argued
repeatedly now, that focus is too narrow. Also important are conse
quences affecting opportunities to form, affirm, and pursue personal
conceptions of choice-worthiness.
This is a normative claim, but it also accords with my understand
ing of important elements of constitutional law. Among the panoply of
constitutional rights, some are best understood as protecting interests
in well-being. The Eighth Amendment prohibitions against "excessive
bail" and "excessive fines " provide examples.185 But others, such as the
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religion, should be
and frequently are interpreted as reflecting partly independent
interests in being able to develop, affirm, and pursue a personal vision
of what is choice-worthy.186 To be sure, rights to freedom of speech
and religion probably tend to promote happiness and preference
satisfaction in most contexts. But rights such as these should be viewed
as resting on less contingent normative foundations than appeals to
social utility.
182. Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U:S. 444, 447 ( 1969) (holding that "the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advo
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"
{footnote omitted)).
1 83. Compare Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Struclllre of
American Constillltional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 , 13-39 (1998) (claiming that all or nearly
all constitutional rights are rights against rules), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
Facial Challenges am/ Third-Party Standing, 1 13 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1 365-66 (2000)
(arguing that although many constitutional rights are rights against rules, not all rights fit this
framework).
1 84. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 5 n.8 ("Welfare economics . . . is a par
ticular species of consequentialism, for it is based (exclusively) on a particular set of conse
quences, namely. those that bear on individuals' well-being.").
1 85. See U.S. CONST. amend. V I II ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed . . . .").
1 86. See Fallon, Two Senses, supra note 49. at 902-03; cf NAGEL, EQUALITY AND
PARTIALITY, supra note 114, at 141 ("Rights to freedom of expression are strongly
supported by their consequences fo r political accountability and the growth of knowledge. as
well as by considerations of individual autonomy.").
·
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I should emphasize that my view about the appropriate definition
of rights, which I believe to be reflected in constitutional law, is
ethically pluralist.187 It does not insist that interests in developing an
independent vision of choice-worthiness, or any other value, should
always prevail over individual well-being and social welfare. It main
tains only that there are values not reducible to well-being that are
sometimes more important.
E.

A

Note on Moral Methodology

In upholding ethical pluralism and arguing that some moral and
constitutional rights should be recognized for reasons other than the
promotion of well-being, I have not only invoked the loosely defined
notion of an impersonal point of view; I have repeatedly cited my own
judgments about what that hypothesized point of view reveals, and I
have appealed to moral convictions that I expect to be widely shared.
In Welfare Versus Fairness, Kaplow and Shaven rightly call attention
to the inherent difficulty in this mode of reasoning. Debunking the
appeals to moral intuition made by fairness theorists, they assert that
moral intuitions are too much the product of social conditioning to
support rigorous, noncircular analysis. 188
The problem is a deep one, but not one that Kaplow and Shavell
can escape any more than fairness theorists can. If moral argument
cannot begin with appeals to moral intuition or conviction, how else
might it begin?189 In defending their own view, Kaplow and Shaven
rely pervasively on such appeals. They appeal to the intuition that
human well-being has normative significance.190 They also draw on a
second, related intuition that any principle that reduces everyone's
well-being deserves to be rejected.191
Methodologically, Kaplow and Shaven appear to believe that
although moral argument may need to start with intuitive or other
1 87. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 86. at 1 4-15 (sketching a "socially grounded,
ideal-based. pluralistic theory of value"); ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 1 67-72
( 1 969) (defending value pluralism); SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 1 22, at 143
(maintaining that "the values that properly guide us remain plural").
1 88. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 71-76 (criticizing philosophers who rely
on intuitions as bases for moral analysis).
189. Cf NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 7 (asserting that "the
use of moral intuition is inevitable, and should not be regretted," in reflective moral reason
ing, and that "[t]o trust our intuitions, particularly those that tell us something is wrong . . .
we need only believe that our moral understanding extends farther than our capacity to spell
out the principles that underlie it").
1 90. They characterize this as a "value judgment" that is implicit in the welfare eco
nomic framework. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 25.
1 91. See hi. at xviii-xix ("Most individuals - including many of the philosophers we
have queried - would not readily endorse a principle of fairness if doing so implies (as it
does) that it may be deemed socially good to make everyone worse off.").
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precritical judgments, it should not stop there.192 Further, critical,
systematizing reflection must occur, to test which precritical
j udgments survive and which do not.193 I agree with this general ap
proach. I partly disagree about its application.
According to Kaplow and Shavell, most intuitive moral judgments
reflect "social norms" or norms of behavior into which children are
commonly socialized.194 Social norms have evolved, they say, to
promote two goals: "to reduce opportunistic behavior toward others
and to help us best advance our interests."195 These two goals can be
subsumed, they write, under the more fundamental conclusion that the
"raison d'etre for social norms " and moral intuitions, which should
therefore be the touchstone of systematic moral thinking, "is to pro
mote individuals' well-being."196
This argument is unpersuasive. To begin with, the two asserted
goals of social norms - "to reduce opportunistic behavior toward
others and to help us best advance our interests" - can pull in
opposite directions. In some cases, behaving opportunistically might
be the best way for any particular person to adv'ance her own interests.
It is far from obvious how these sometimes divergent desiderata
conjoin as elements of a master aim of "promot[ing] individuals' well
being," especially insofar as Kaplow and Shavell leave the concept of
well-being substantially undefined.
A second objection is more fundamental. Even if most intuitive
moral judgments did trace to social norms that were functionally
adapted to the promotion of individual and social well-being (as
somehow defined), the question would remain: But should well-being
be the exclusive concern of private moral deliberation and public
decisionmaking? Cultural history and evolutionary biology cannot
answer this question.197 An answer can only be sought through moral
inquiry, conducted before the tribunal of reason. We need to examine
1 92 See id. at 73-74 & n.108 {distinguishing "the direct use of particular intuitions or
instincts about the fairness of particular acts or rules from the systematic study of a wide
range of such intuitions for the purposes of critically assessing them and thereby attempting
to identify what principle or principles underlie them").
1 93. See id. at 72 n.108 ("Unless we believe our instincts and intuitions to have been
implanted through an infallible (perhaps divine) mechanism, we must inquire into their
possible origins and functions in order to assess what weight, if any, we should give them as
evaluative principles.").
1 94. See id. at 62 {"We submit that there is often a correspondence - indeed,
sometimes an identity - between notions of fairness that are used as independent principles
for the evaluation of legal rules and various social norms that guide ordinary individuals in
their everyday lives.").
195. Id. at 71.
1 96. Id.
197. See NAGEL, LAST WORD, supra note 135, at 105-06 (observing that appeals to con
vention, cultural practice, or social background cannot resolve ultimate normative ques
tions).
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whether we have most reason to try to base all legal rules and moral
precepts on calculations of individual well-being, as somehow defined,
or whether other considerations · also matter.
Kaplow and Shavell have provided their reasons for thinking that
all legal judgments should be based exclusively on considerations of
individual well-being. I have criticized their arguments and now, in
admittedly sketchier terms, have provided reasons for adopting a dif
fe rent framework, capable of supporting rights against welfare, as well
as rights that are based on welfare.
CONCLUSION

. As Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have emphasized, a moral or
legal theory that relies on considerations other than well-being risks
diminishing the well-being of literally everyone. They believe that
theorists who value considerations other than well-being should be
deeply disconcerted by this largely tautological observation (that
theories that do not set out exclusively to promote well-being may
sometimes di minish well-being, imaginably including the well-being of
literally everyone, at least in far-fetched cases198). According to Kap
low and Shavell, reflection on this hazard should lead all legal analysts
to embrace a form of welfare economics.
In assessing the argument advanced by Kaplow and Shave)) to
make well-being the exclusive concern of legal policy analysis, I have
argued that it matters enormously how well-being is defined. Under
what I have called an ordinal conception, each person's well-being is
measured on a scale comprising that person's own ranked preferences
among states of affairs. Her well-being is increased or diminished as
she moves up or down that ranked list, regardless of the basis for her
rankings. In criticizing "fairness" theories, Kaplow and Shavell em
phasize such theories' capacity to diminish well-being as measured by
the affected people's ordinal scales. Significantly, however, the welfare
economic approach endorsed by Kaplow and Shaven cannot employ a
purely ordinal conception of well-being. According to Kaplow and
Shavell, welfare economics requires interpersonal comparisons of
utility; analysts need to assess whether and when increases in the well
being of some are sufficiently large to justify diminutions in the well
being of others. For interpersonal comparisons to be possible,
however, well-being must be specified in terms of a uniform substan
tive metric such as happiness or preference satisfaction.

1 98. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL. supra note 3. at 58 ("[I]t is virtually a tautology to assert
that fairness-based evaluation entails some sort of reduction in individuals' well-being, for
notions of fairness are principles of evaluation that give weight to factors unrelated to indi
viduals' well-being.").
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As soon as well-being is given a substantive definition, however,
then a person's well-being can no longer be definitionally equated
with what she necessarily values most or would choose for herself as
reflected by her ordinal preference scale. If, for example, well-being
were defined as preference satisfaction or as happiness, then people
might value freedom of speech and religion more than marginal
increments of well-being. (Better Socrates dissatisfied than a fool sat
isfied.) Indeed, it becomes imaginable that the well-being maximizing
rule (if well-being were thus defined) might sometimes be one that
literally no one would choose.
This is a point of fundamental importance in ·the evaluation of
Kaplow and Shavell's argument: their own preferred welfare economic
methodology is vulnerable to the same c:ijticism that they think
qevastates fairness theories. Their version of welfare economics might
dictate legal rules that would increase well-being as defined by an
analyst's chosen substantive measure, but that no one would choose
and that would make everyone worse-off as measured by ordinal preference rankings.
Recognition of the potential gap between substantive conceptions
of well-being and what a person might rationally choose reveals the
need for careful reflection on the relation of well-being to other
values. In contrast with Kaplow and Shavell's argument that well
being is the architectonic value of values, I have maintained that well
being is more perspicuously defined in less imperialistic terms. As I
would define it, well-being is an important prudential value, involving
a sequence of diverse but desirable experiential states over the course
of a complete life, but it is not necessarily the exclusive rational aim.
From a personal point of view, we may value ideals more than our
own well-being. Nor is well-being all that matters when we assume an
impersonal moral perspective. We value diverse goods in diver�e ways
and recognize morally various obligations and constraints. Choice
worthiness is a concept distinct from well-being.
Just as well-being is not necessarily all that people value, nor what
they would always choose for themselves, neither should it function as
the exclusive concern in the design of legal rules. Whereas our reasons
to value our own well-being are prudential , decisions about the
content of legal rules should be moral ones, reflecting impartial judg
ments of what we owe to each other and what a political community
owes to its citizens. From an impartial perspective, individual well
being matters, but other considerations are also pertinent. Crucial
among these, I have argued, are individual choice and the background
conditions necessary for autonomous judgment. When well-being is
distinguished from choice-worthiness, and opportunities for autono
mous choice are seen to have a value independent of what is chosen,
grounds emerge for the recognition of rights against welfare.
·

.

